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ABSTRACT 
 
 In recent years, political theorists witnessed two explosions of Aristotle 
scholarship.  One, which I call commentary scholarship, aims to uncover Aristotle’s 
argument. The other, which I call appropriation scholarship, creates political theories 
inspired by Aristotle’s thought. Appropriation scholarship allows its readers to tease out 
implications of emphasis – that is, to explain how emphasizing aspects of Aristotle’s 
argument colors the appropriator’s conclusions.  The projects of appropriation 
scholarship fall into four broad instantiations, which I call Modified Aristotelianism 
(Alasdair MacIntyre), Abstract Aristotelianism (Martha Nussbaum), Practical 
Aristotelianism (Hannah Arendt), and Intuitive Aristotelianism (William Galston).
 
Nuanced but significant differences between the projects concern two points: first, the 
foundation (i.e., what they emphasize in Aristotle), and second, the results (i.e., how they 
extend and apply Aristotle’s position).   
Contemporary Aristotelians suggest that there is something about Aristotle’s 
perspective that is necessary to understand the world. Why? Aristotle’s first and most 
crucial contribution is his portrayal of human beings as political creatures – that is, his 
argument for the primacy of politics for human fulfillment.  Second, and only slightly 
less crucial, is Aristotle’s portrayal and defense of human excellence.  Although they 
reach diverse conclusions, contemporary Aristotelians all rely on these two unique 
contributions.  In addition, contemporary Aristotelians also exhort fellow philosophers to 
 iii 
 
 
recognize Aristotle as essential to comprehensive moral-political theories.  Around these 
two points, we might reconcile contemporary versions of Aristotelianism.   
Differences in what they take from Aristotle, however, overshadow this common 
ground.  These differences lead to stronger and weaker versions of Aristotelianism, some 
providing a robust defense of Aristotle’s role in improving moral-political theory and 
others diminishing their own attempts to appropriate Aristotle by distending his 
commitments.  In different ways, Modified and Intuitive Aristotelianism provide 1) the 
most decisive arguments for Aristotle’s pivotal role in contemporary political theory and 
2) the most well-developed application of Aristotle’s insights to moral-political 
questions.  Despite renewed interest in his thought, Aristotle’s insights are lost in a haze 
of competing arguments.  By identifying the most defensible versions of contemporary 
Aristotelianism, scholars can reclaim those insights and work toward applying them to 
current circumstances.   
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CHAPTER I 
 INTRODUCTION: ARISTOTLE’S APPROPRIATORS 
 
“Liberalism has demonstrated an almost unprecedented capacity for absorbing its 
competitors, aided by…its own virtuosity in reinventing itself and incorporating key 
elements from opposing traditions” (Dryzek, Honig, & Phillips, 2006, p. 23). 
 
The “mongrel sub-discipline” of political theory is experiencing “a time of 
energetic and expansive debate”  (Dryzek et al., 2006, pp. 34, 14).  This debate makes 
plain “the dominance that has been achieved by liberalism” (Dryzek et al., 2006, p. 14).  
Since the publication of A Theory of Justice by John Rawls (1971), political theorists are 
often classified as proponents of some version of liberalism or critics of liberalism.
1
  
While these thinkers may also be other things, the prominence of this classification 
scheme reveals that, however nuanced liberalism may be, it is the dominant approach to 
the normative questions of politics.
2
 
What is distinct, then, about contemporary liberalism’s approach to political 
questions? What is liberalism?  Zvesper (1991, pp. 285-286) describes it succinctly: 
The basic principle of modern liberalism is the view that politics is artificial.  
Government is necessary, but it is not natural.  Liberty is the natural human 
                                                 
1
 Indeed, the entry for John Rawls in The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Political Thought 
refers to A Theory of Justice “as the greatest single influence on Anglo-American 
political philosophy over the last fifteen [now twenty five] years”   (Miller, 1991, p. 
422). Therefore, using the distinction of adherent or critic, whatever nuances emerge in 
each category, seems appropriate.  
2
 See Dryzek et al. (2006, pp. 13-35) for a particularly cogent explanation.   
 2 
 
 
condition.  Political authority is conventional.  Reason can guide politics, but 
nature furnishes reason no positive goals for political conventions, only negative 
ones, chiefly the avoidance of death, disease, and poverty.  There are no ways of 
life and therefore no classes of human beings that can claim to rule by natural or 
supernatural right.  The legitimate ends of government are limited to securing the 
conditions of all ways of life, and therefore consist of largely of the secular goals 
of peace and prosperity….These are the foundations of liberal thinking…the 
absence of positive moral guidance in nature, the priority of liberty over 
authority, the secularization of politics, and the promotion of constitutions of 
government and principles of law that establish the limits of government and the 
rights of citizens against government. 
 
This mode of thinking is now pervasive in not only political philosophy, but in Western 
culture. But, as the two-fold classification presented above suggests, liberalism is not 
without its critics.   
 What does liberalism lack?  Where do its principles fall short?  Literature 
addressing these questions is the literature of the crisis of liberalism.  The critique and 
subsequent crisis may be summarized as follows: 
…in stressing abstract individuals and their rights as building blocks for political 
theory, liberalism missed the importance of the community that creates 
individuals as they actually exist (Dryzek et al., 2006, p. 19). 
 
This dissertation deals head on with the crisis of liberalism.  Specifically, I examine four 
political theorists working (sometimes begrudgingly) within the liberal condition to 
reinvigorate its concepts of community, virtue, and individual contentment.  They do this 
by turning to Aristotle and “incorporating key elements from [this] opposing tradition” 
into liberalism (Dryzek et al., 2006, p. 23). But, before I turn to these four thinkers, I 
should offer a definition of the crisis of liberalism. 
The crisis of liberalism goes by many names: the crisis of modernity, the failure 
of the Enlightenment, the crisis of morality, the crisis of the liberal condition, and the 
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problem of political discontent, to name a few.  Addressing the crisis of liberalism is the 
project of working on, as Martha Nussbaum (2006, p. 4) describes, “the unsolved 
problems of justice.” She (2006, p. 4) puts it well when she argues,  
These problems are not simply problems in academic philosophy.  [They]…have 
deep and broad influence in our political life.  Images of who were are and why 
we get together shape our thinking about what political principles we should 
favor and who should be involved in their framing….It is actually quite 
helpful…to go to the root of the problem, so to speak: for then we see much more 
clearly why we got into such a difficulty and what we must change if we wish to 
advance. 
 
To get at these problems, to get at the crisis of liberalism, we must first take note of the 
major characteristics of the crisis: dissatisfying, deteriorating political association and a 
failure to justify morality using reason.  Liberalism’s political association is dissatisfying 
because it is alliance-based, but more on that after the diagnosis of liberalism’s crisis is 
addressed. We seek a thicker, more purposive, more holistic form of political 
association: something deeper than an association, a community. The political 
association, the political life, liberalism creates lacks social connection; I am referring to 
life without meaning, life without context, a feeling of isolation marked by the inability 
to communicate and find common ground with our fellows.  Here, I mean the context of 
morality and the communication only possible through shared moral commitments, or, at 
a minimum, a shared standard of moral defensibility.  But, again, more on that after the 
diagnosis of liberalism’s crisis is addressed. 
The crisis of liberalism is simply put: liberalism leaves us unable to answer the 
question, “How ought we to decide between the claims of rival and incompatible 
accounts of justice competing for our moral, social, and political allegiance (MacIntyre, 
 4 
 
 
1988, p. 2) ?” This leaves us with a mechanistic basis of political association, which is 
dissatisfying.  The fragmented intellectual terrain of liberalism lacks “fundamental 
assumptions…[needed] to articulate disagreements and organize debates” (MacIntyre, 
1990, pp. 216-217).
3
  In short, liberalism has failed to give us both a common ground to 
start our debates and a standard of defensibility to decide when those debates may end.  
Knowing where to start our moral debates and knowing they are not intractable protects 
us from moral relativism. As Galston (1991, p. 22) tells us, “the relativization of truth 
claims, both scientific and normative…is unacceptable.” The crisis of liberalism, then, is 
a crisis of morality.  Galston (1991, p. 29) compares the crisis to a society 
…whose members were no longer moved by criteria of formal rationality, that is, 
who were simply not bothered by contradictions among beliefs or between 
beliefs and practices….this would amount to a fundamental change in the 
meaning of being human. Nevertheless, this is what the call for the exorcism of 
the metaphysical impulse reduces to.  
 
What we need, and what liberalism fails to give us, is a way to figure out these 
contradictions, an adjudicator with teeth.  The four thinkers I discuss have come to the 
conclusion that a rational justification of a particular view of justice and morality is 
possible, but not within the strict philosophical confines of liberalism.  It is liberalism’s 
                                                 
3
 Alasdair MacIntyre provides one of the most extensive and most famous treatments of 
the crisis of modernity in three of his most famous works, After Virtue (1984), Whose 
Justice? Which Rationality? (1988), and Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry (1990).  
Hannah Arendt, Martha Nussbaum, and William Galston each deal with the failings of 
liberalism, but none offers a discussion on par with MacIntyre’s in terms of 
philosophical depth and diagnosis.  As such, I reference his treatment.   
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simultaneous assertion of neutrality, its prioritization of nondiscrimination between ends, 
combined with its implicit nonneutrality, that makes it philosophically weak.  Liberalism 
cannot adjudicate between moral claims because it refuses to discuss determinate, 
substantive ends, particularly the end of politics as “nothing less than to enable people to 
develop their distinctive human capacities” (Sandel, 2009, p. 194).  Adding a discussion 
of those ends into liberal theory requires, at a minimum, a modification of liberalism’s  
understanding of politics.  
Politics can no longer be simply about alliance, covenant, or exchange (Sandel, 
2009, p. 193). Movements toward Aristotle’s work in contemporary political theory 
suggest this modification is best done by incorporating Aristotle’s teleology into 
liberalism.  The secular nature of Aristotle’s work makes it particularly appealing to 
contemporary political theory.  Without additions or modifications, liberalism lacks “the 
explanatory power” to help us resolve our moral debates (MacIntyre, 1990, p. 403).  We 
are left with “unsolved problems of justice.…that the classical theory of the social 
contract cannot solve” (Nussbaum, 2006, p. 3).  These unsolved problems have led some 
to refer to liberalism’s crisis as a crisis of morality. 
What does the crisis of morality look like? Regardless of the thinkers or 
traditions responsible for its beginning,
4
 the phrase crisis of morality describes modern 
political philosophy’s inability to justify morality with reason (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 14). 
                                                 
4
 Martha Nussbaum (2004, p. 60), for example, emphasizes Jeremy Bentham’s 
Utilitarianism, while Alasdair MacIntyre (1984, p. 53) highlights the Protestant 
Reformation, Jansenist Catholic movement and Enlightenment science.  
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Reason has been removed from discussions of morality and charged with “truths of fact 
and mathematical relations but nothing more” (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 54).  
If reason once bolstered morality, what supports morality now? Morality is 
sometimes justified with cultural analysis, meaning it lacks the universals to determine 
the particulars. Philosophies claiming transcendence or relying on metaphysics have 
been evicted from the public sphere (Galston, 1991, p. 23). In cases where reason has 
been replaced with a combination of grace and Enlightenment science, liberalism makes 
“questions of truth in morality and theology…matter[s] for private allegiances”  
(MacIntyre, 1984, p. 54). 
When political or philosophical thinkers abandoned reason as a justification for 
morality, when morality became culture-based and privatized, society was left 
disoriented.  The existence of private belief is not, in and of itself, problematic.  The 
issues emerge when certain categories of private belief find themselves summarily 
excluded from public discourse.  This exclusion eventually leads to the exclusion of 
questions of morality from the public sphere (Galston, 2002).  This lumps morality in the 
same category as preference.  Preference-based morality classifies “moral judgments 
[as]… nothing but expressions of…attitude or feeling” (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 12).  For 
liberalism, emotivism and relativism are two sides of the same coin.  If morality is 
merely an expression of preference, radical individualism becomes the order of the day.  
Without a purpose or telos to unite us, we cannot create community and we cannot guard 
our moral commitments from competing claims (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 10). 
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What is so dangerous about a world of individuals without communities?  
Human beings can only understand themselves – that is, understand our purpose – in 
community.  Community is the venue in which we develop ourselves, in which we 
practice our character and, we hope, experience happiness and contentment.  We are 
story-telling creatures who receive moral teachings from the stories of our community 
(MacIntyre, 1984).  
To avoid emotivism and relativism, we must have a rational basis for morality. 
Three things are required to provide this rational justification for morality.  The first 
element is the recognition that we are incomplete and unfulfilled without morality 
(MacIntyre, 1984, pp. 50, 54).  The second element is the belief that we have a telos, a 
vision of how we could be or ought to be. The third element is the belief this telos is 
worth seeking (MacIntyre, 1984).  Part of this third element is the argument that 
morality is the means of pursuing the telos of our existence (MacIntyre, 1984).   
Liberal projects to provide a rational basis for morality have failed because 
liberalism rejects a teleological “view of human nature…as having an essence which 
defines…[its] true end” (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 54).  Regardless of your description of this 
telos, people must acknowledge that the concept itself exists. The purposive view of 
human nature provides the frame for discussing moral questions.   
But, how did liberalism deny or reject an essential view of human nature?  The 
Reformation and related movements questioned the telos of the “old religion” and 
brought the existence of telos itself into question (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 52). 
Enlightenment science depicted an atomistic, mechanistic natural world “governed by 
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the laws of physics” (Sandel, 2009, p. 189).  If the natural world lacked purpose, lacked 
essential meaning and direction, then human nature must also lack such purpose.  The 
secularization of morality combined with mechanistic science destroyed political 
philosophy’s belief in reason’s ability to illuminate the second element, the existence of 
our telos.  Left with no grounding for morality, we are left without a framework to 
understand our behavior, to understand our lives as part of a purposeful whole.  As such, 
we are faced with three choices.   
First, we could fruitlessly continue to compare moral schemas as we compare 
preferences.  Second, we could figuratively throw our hands up and work to escape from 
community.
5
  Third, and what I advocate for here, we can work to regain the rational 
basis of morality by looking to traditions apart from liberalism.  We can work to give 
ourselves, once again, the context of community. Pursuing anything but this third option 
leads to isolation, relativism, and the continued deterioration of political community. 
What about our isolation, relativism, and lack of context is problematic? Why do we 
need to purse this third option? 
Only the third option, only looking outside of liberalism, gives us the context of 
meaningful community.  Indeed, liberalism is designed to intentionally not provide this 
context. Depriving human beings of the purpose and context only community offers 
forces us to our nature, to ignore our purpose, and leaves us discontented (MacIntyre, 
1984, p. ix). Without the “context of practical beliefs and of supporting habits of 
thought, feeling, and action,” modern, liberal societies leave us without the ability to 
                                                 
5
 Rousseau and Nietzsche take this second option.  
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understand or justify our commitments concerning the human good (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 
ix).  As Michael Sandel (1996, p. ix) puts it, “For all we may resist such ultimate 
questions as the meaning of justice and the nature of the good life, what we cannot 
escape is that we live some answer to those questions – we live some theory – all the 
time.”  This is the heart of the problem with liberalism’s false neutrality (something 
William Galston explores and I will discuss in a later chapter). As Galston will tell us, 
we intuitively know political community must be about more than mutual prosperity and 
protection; it must make us better, happier, more content.  It must be purposive.  
Liberalism lacks the philosophical context to help us create purposive 
community because it does not understand political community in that way. In fact, 
community may be too strong a term for the mutually-beneficial association liberalism 
advocates. If utility is the only justification of political association, we are left with a 
political and social order “inimical to the construction and sustaining of the types of 
communal relationship required for the best kind of human life”(MacIntyre, 1984, p. 
xv). Whether we know it or not, we are searching for a way to justify and to ground our 
understanding about the best ways to live, both in terms of individual action and social 
interaction.  What should I do? How should I live?  How should we live together? Those 
of us living in advanced, liberal democracies flounder when faced with these questions. 
We devolve into relativism, because liberalism, as a philosophy, provides “no rational 
way of securing moral agreement” (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 6). The best it offers is false 
neutrality.   
When faced with liberalism’s inability to help us find common ground on moral 
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questions, to find answers to the inquiries about what I should do and how I should live, 
Aristotle is attractive because of the way his method and conclusions work together. We 
are looking for answers to the questions above, but we are also looking for the way to 
arrive at those answers. The method and the conclusions facilitate our flourishing – that 
is, a life without either of these things is discontented; it is not good for man.  Aristotle’s 
philosophy provides us with: 1) a justification and description of meaningful, purposive 
community and individual existence, and 2) a method affirming our job as scientists, as 
theorists, as thinking people is “to make plain the nature of things” (Salkever, 1990, p. 
262).   
Aristotle’s method is two-fold.  First, Aristotle works to refine implicit – what 
Galston will later call intuitive – practical wisdom.  His theorizing concerns “particular 
customs and forms of discourse, rather than principled commitment” (Salkever, 1990, p. 
262). Aristotle works to “articulate an account [of the good life] that is implicit in the 
thought, utterance and action of an educated Athenian” (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 148).  
While we no longer live in the polis, Aristotelianism lets us use The Philosopher’s 
method of looking to the best and brightest among us, those with cultivated inclinations 
for implicit answers to our moral questions (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 149). 
Aristotle’s impact on political theory is difficult to underestimate.  Indeed, the 
history of Western political thought may, in part, be chronicled by the introduction, 
temporary disappearance, dominance, rejection, and reemergence of various 
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interpretations of Aristotle’s thought.6  In recent years, political theorists have witnessed 
two distinct developments in Aristotle scholarship.  One, which I call commentary 
scholarship, is an analytical effort to identify and explain Aristotle’s arguments. The 
other, which I call appropriation scholarship, is the articulation of political theories 
inspired and informed by elements of Aristotle’s thought.  I argue that these two veins of 
scholarship build on each other, with commentary scholarship providing the 
philosophical grounding and appropriation scholarship working to extend and apply 
various aspects of Aristotle’s thought.   
Commentary scholarship, I argue, has two distinct features.  First, its adherents 
propose accurate readings of Aristotle, drawing our attention to overlooked or 
undervalued textual and historical evidence relevant to perennial debates about 
Aristotle’s philosophy.  Second, such scholars neither implicitly (through adopting a 
particular position) nor explicitly identify themselves as Aristotelian.  Commentary 
scholarship will receive brief attention here, but not the sort its contributors might desire. 
That is, I do not propose a correct understanding of Aristotle’s thought or a gold 
standard for the proper interpretation of Aristotle’s philosophy.   
Far more interesting to me are Aristotle’s appropriators, scholars engaged in 
interpreting, extending and applying Aristotle to contemporary circumstances.  
                                                 
6
 For a brief introduction of Aristotle’s influence on the history of political thought, see 
Pocock (1975), Wolin (2004), Strauss and Cropsey (1987), Sheldon (2003), Kassim 
(2000), Skinner (1978, 2002), Nederman (1992, 1994, 1996), Sharples (2001), Sorabji 
(1990), and Tessitore (2002) to name a few. 
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Appropriation scholarship allows scholars to tease out the implications of emphasis – 
that is, to explain how emphasizing or deemphasizing particular aspects of Aristotle’s 
argument colors contemporary scholars’ arguments and conclusions.  Contemporary 
thinkers from a variety of intellectual camps claim the mantle of Aristotelianism.   
Each thinker highlights different elements of Aristotle’s work, creating versions 
of Aristotelianism with unique strengths and weaknesses.  Aristotle informs and inspires 
surprisingly diverse projects; I argue these projects fall into four, broad instantiations, 
which I call Modified Aristotelianism (Alasdair MacIntyre), Abstract Aristotelianism 
(Martha Nussbaum), Practical Aristotelianism (Hannah Arendt), and Intuitive 
Aristotelianism (William Galston).
 7
  Nuanced, but significant, differences between these 
projects concern two points: first, the foundation (i.e., what they emphasize in Aristotle), 
and second, the results (i.e., how they extend and apply Aristotle’s position).   
Of even greater significance, the extensions and applications (however disparate 
and controversial) in appropriation scholarship illustrate the appeal and relevance of 
                                                 
7
 For different classifications of contemporary Aristotelianism, see Wallach (1992) and 
Knight (2007).  Both argue that Arendt’s theory is inspired by Aristotle, but stops short 
of being Aristotelian per se.  This categorization of Arendt, I argue, is incomplete.  
Arendt’s use of praxis as the foundation for her practical political goal to provide 
theoretical defenses against totalitarianism and fascism exemplifies a particular vein of 
Aristotle scholarship, practical Aristotelianism.  Rather than warranting exclusion, 
Arendt’s laser-like focus on praxis illustrates a distinctive feature of one type of 
contemporary Aristotelianism.   
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Aristotle’s philosophy to the current moral-political world.  Contemporary Aristotelians 
bring Aristotle’s insights to bear on modern debates about the perennial questions of 
human experience. What is the purpose of human life?  What should be the goal of all 
our efforts and activities? How should I live?  What kind of life will bring me happiness 
and contentment?  How should I relate to my fellow citizens? What can/should I expect 
from social and political institutions?  These thinkers suggest that we need Aristotle and 
his successors to understand the current moral-political world, but why?  Is there 
something about Aristotle’s perspective that is necessary and sufficient for this project?  
In short, yes.   
Examining different versions of contemporary Aristotelianism reveals the 
potential uses of Aristotle’s work in theories about the current moral-political world.  
Aristotle’s first and most crucial contribution is his portrayal of human beings as 
political creatures – that is, his argument for the primacy of politics for human 
fulfillment.  Second, and only slightly less crucial, is Aristotle’s portrayal and defense of 
human excellence.  Although they reach diverse conclusions, I argue that contemporary 
Aristotelians all rely on these two unique contributions, although they often emphasize 
others as well.  In addition to this similarity, contemporary Aristotelians also join 
together in their exhortation to fellow political philosophers to recognize Aristotle (and 
his contributions) as essential to comprehensive moral-political theories.  Around these 
two points, we might reconcile contemporary versions of Aristotelianism.   
Differences in what they take from Aristotle, however, overshadow this common 
ground.  These differences, I argue, lead to stronger and weaker versions of 
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Aristotelianism, some providing a robust defense of Aristotle’s role in improving moral-
political theory and others diminishing their own attempts to appropriate Aristotle by 
distending his commitments beyond recognition.  In different ways, Modified and 
Intuitive Aristotelianism provide 1) the most decisive arguments for Aristotle’s pivotal 
role in contemporary political theory, and 2) the most well-developed application of 
Aristotle’s insights to political and ethical questions.  Aristotle has much to offer the 
moral-political world, but despite renewed interest in his thought, his insights are often 
lost in a haze of competing emphases and arguments.  By identifying the most defensible 
versions of contemporary Aristotelianism, scholars can reclaim those insights and work 
toward applying them to current debates and circumstances.  Before moving on to that 
project, however, a brief examination of the differences between commentary and 
appropriation scholarship is necessary. 
Highlights of the commentary scholarship involve several aspects, from new 
readings of Aristotle’s best life8 to reinterpretations of his megalopsychos and moral 
virtue
9
 to debates about the implications of Aristotle’s metaphysical biology for his 
political philosophy
10
 to reinterpretations of Aristotle’s political exclusions11 to debates 
about the meaning and implications of Aristotle’s assertion “that a human being is by 
                                                 
8
 See Tessitore (1992) and Bartlett (1994). 
9
 See Howland (2002), Collins (2004), and Ward (2001). 
10
 See Frank (2004), Cherry (2008), and Nichols (1992).  
11
 See Swanson (1992). 
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nature a political animal.”12  I take this scholarship as a collection of commentaries on 
Aristotle, rather than appropriations of the Philosopher’s arguments.  Commentary 
scholarship may be distinguished from appropriation scholarship in two ways.  First, 
each thinker offers the ‘correct’ (or at least more accurate) reading of Aristotle, drawing 
our attention to linkages, overlooked passages, historical details, etc. relevant to 
perennial debates about the character of Aristotle’s philosophy.  Second, commentary 
scholars neither implicitly (through taking a particular position) nor explicitly identify 
themselves as Aristotelian.
13
  Aristide Tessitore (2002) and Judith Swanson (1992) 
provide excellent examples of such a project.  Addressing the claim that Aristotle’s 
ethical theory is inconsistent in that it includes two competing conceptions of the best 
                                                 
12
 See Aristotle, Politics 1253a1-10.  See Mulgan (1974), Ambler (1985), Keyt (1987), 
and Nederman (1994).  My treatment of commentary scholarship is brief.  I chose works 
published in or after 1992 because Wallach’s “Contemporary Aristotelianism” was 
published in 1992 and my project is, in part, a continuation of his.  I disagree, however, 
with Wallach’s classification of the various versions of contemporary Aristotelianism.  
As such, I did not restrict the works I chose as examples of appropriation scholarship to 
those published in or after 1992.   
13
 But, one may ask, what of the debate concerning ability of Aristotle’s ethical and 
political theory to stand apart from his theoretical propositions (i.e., his metaphysical 
biology)?  The question is reasonable; to it, I answer that this debate is conducted on 
entirely different ground, for entirely different stakes.   
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life, Tessitore (2002, p. 214) delves into the text and concludes, “It is not that Aristotle is 
inconsistent, but that he consistently resists the temptation to try to reconcile completely 
two elevated ways of life which cannot be in every respect reconciled.” A decade earlier, 
Swanson (1992, p. 63) presented a new reading of Aristotle’s views on women, arguing 
that “female and philosophical virtues intersect” in Aristotle’s work and that his 
assertions about their natural inequality are less severe than most readings suggest.    
Both Swanson (1992) and Tessitore (2002) contribute tentative answers to 
questions of philosophical interest; they do not, however, use or appropriate Aristotle.  
Of course, their arguments meticulously reference Aristotle’s work, but they (and the 
scholarship they exemplify) do not adopt any of Aristotle’s principles to offer a more 
comprehensive, more accurate, or otherwise “better” ethical or political theory.  These 
sorts of contributions, I argue, are self-contained – that is, commentary scholarship takes 
a position on Aristotle, but stops short of taking a position on either ethics or politics.  
The authors speak about Aristotle, but not as overt Aristotelians.  Their arguments tell us 
how political theorists should read Aristotle, but not what Aristotle can contribute to 
politics or ethics, or for that matter, to ordinary people.  Commentary scholarship does 
little to connect its philosophical conclusions with the moral-political world.  If the 
“…power of political theory depends on its ability to address and illuminate major 
sentiments, intuitions, and beliefs of its audience about political life,” commentary 
scholarship finds itself considerably lacking (Wallach, 1992, p. 613). 
 In contrast, Aristotle’s appropriators interpret Aristotle in order to apply his 
insights to contemporary circumstances.  At times, these scholars offer commentary, but 
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they devote the majority of their energy to constructing an original moral-political theory 
inspired by Aristotle.  Here, construction serves as an appropriate analogy because 
Aristotle acts as the foundation for their theories; these theories, however, frequently 
build on Aristotle’s own practical political conclusions (e.g., the exclusion of women 
from political and philosophical life).  But if these scholars are all using Aristotle as their 
foundation, how could their final theories be so divergent?  I propose to analyze 
comparatively four notable instantiations of Aristotelianism. An attempt to classify or 
label nuanced arguments is perilous, but categorization also reaps great benefits.  By 
categorizing the contemporary writings on Aristotle into genres according to their 
approach and emphasis, I simultaneously render the literature manageable while drawing 
a coherent picture of the purchase Aristotle (in his myriad forms) offers political 
theorists today.     
 My comparative analysis of contemporary Aristotelians focuses on two 
questions.  First, how is each thinker an Aristotelian?  That is, what elements of 
Aristotle’s argument does each thinker place in the foreground?  Notice that the 
respective thinkers’ Aristotelianism is not called into question.  I do not propose to 
provide the guidelines for what can and cannot be labeled Aristotelian (at least not 
beyond commitment to the two core doctrines mentioned above).  Second, what are the 
implications of this emphasis?  Does it place any limitations on the theory?  How does it 
strengthen the theory? 
The core difference between the four Aristotelianisms is one of emphasis – that 
is, each scholar selects certain aspects of Aristotle’s work and uses that aspect 
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(sometimes with significant modifications) to inform his or her own arguments.  To get 
at the heart of their differing theoretical conclusions, we must identify their differences 
of emphasis.  These differences create unique strengths and weaknesses, ultimately 
revealing important implications for the limits of Aristotelianism in contemporary 
political theory.  Like respected and influential work, Aristotle’s philosophy is 
sometimes stretched or truncated beyond recognition. Martha Nussbaum’s Abstract 
Aristotelianism represents such a stretch, as I shall show, while Arendt’s Practical 
Aristotelianism represents such a truncation.  To be clear, by “beyond recognition,” I do 
not mean to imply that these theories are not Aristotelian.  Rather, I mean to suggest that 
their emphasized aspects of Aristotle’s philosophy are ultimately unable to support their 
conclusions.  In contrast, the aspects of Aristotle’s work emphasized in Modified and 
Intuitive Aristotelianism do provide adequate support for the theoretical conclusions of 
Alasdair MacIntyre and William Galston.  I argue that identifying the differences of 
emphasis also identifies the weakest instantiations of contemporary Aristotelianism and 
the most vulnerable (and ultimately defenseless) uses of Aristotle.  Knowing the limits 
of Aristotle’s theory allows scholars to abandon indefensible Aristotelianism(s) and 
concentrate their energies on making defensible Aristotelianism more coherent (and 
applicable).   
To begin to distinguish between more and less defensible versions of 
Aristotelianism, I now turn to an outline of each appropriator examined in this 
dissertation.  The first is Hannah Arendt, and what I call her Practical Aristotelianism. I 
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argue Arendt adapts Aristotle’s Politics, emphasizing his concept of citizenship (as the 
source for political authority) and political action (praxis).   
Arendt’s (1977, p. 19) adoption, however, disconnects Aristotle’s politics from 
his ethics in that she emphasizes she the “political and social conditions” of action 
(praxis) and speech (logos), while largely glazing over Aristotle’s allegedly abstract 
ethical foundations. Arendt uses Aristotle’s description of political practice to inform her 
conclusions on political authority, authentic human experience, labor, and political life.  
For Arendt, Aristotle enables political philosophy to reconnect with the material world, 
with real politics.  
 Like Aristotle, Arendt argues that the political life is the most comprehensive, 
complete human life.  She posits that Aristotle’s insistence that human fulfillment 
depends on “life in a polis” allows political philosophers to avoid “depriving thought of 
reality and action of sense” (Arendt, 1977, pp. 23-25).  Arendt highlights Aristotle’s 
argument that human life is a cyclical “kind of praxis” characterized by “action and 
speech” (1977, p. 42).14 “Action and speech,” for Arendt, “are indeed the two activities 
whose end result will always be a story with enough coherence to be told” (1977, p. 97). 
Arendt builds on Aristotle’s distinguishing characteristic of human existence, 
particularly, its cyclical nature, to argue that understanding and improving of our natural, 
practical world is essential.   
The public activity of politics, then, becomes the primary focus of philosophy.  
Arendt makes this argument by emphasizing Aristotle’s Politics, particularly praxis and 
                                                 
14
 See Aristotle, Politics 1254a7. 
 20 
 
 
citizenship.  For Arendt, Aristotle becomes a remedy for the shortcomings of the 
dominant philosophies of her day (e.g., existentialism).  Arendt (1998, p. 49) admits that 
virtue (aretê) “has always been assigned to the public realm” and, like Aristotle, she 
insists that praxis should be the goal of moral-political theory, but she largely ignores the 
substance of the virtue Aristotle uses to inform and guide praxis.  As such, Arendt 
(1998, p. 49) disconnects Aristotle’s Politics from his ethical arguments, going so far as 
to criticize Aristotle’s insistence that beneficial political community requires the 
cultivation of habits into a stable disposition (hexis).  This disconnection of Aristotle’s 
political philosophy from its ethical foundation serves as the chief weakness of Arendt’s 
Practical Aristotelianism. 
The weakness of Practical Aristotelianism mirrors the weakness of what I call 
Abstract Aristotelianism, that is, Martha Nussbaum’s appropriation of Aristotle. Both 
theories adopt Aristotle piecemeal. Arendt drew on his practical political work, while 
ignoring the symbiotic relationship between political practice and Aristotle’s ethical 
foundations. Nussbaum took his metaphysical commitment to the common good and 
human sociability, while neglecting Aristotle’s substantive definition of the common 
good.  Arendt’s overemphasis on political action leaves her Aristotelianism weak 
because she ignores the metaphysical foundations of Aristotle’s project, ironically 
abstracting his position on the primacy of political action to construct her Practical 
Aristotelianism.   
Here, I examine Martha Nussbaum’s Aristotelianism as articulated in her 
explanation of the ‘capabilities approach.’  To be clear, I am not offering standards for 
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the proper interpretation of Aristotle or criteria to determine whether or not Nussbaum is 
an Aristotelian.  Instead, I identify the core of Nussbaum’s Aristotelianism – that is, the 
elements of Aristotle’s argument that Nussbaum places in the foreground.  I argue that 
Nussbaum adopts Aristotle’s commitment to human sociability, human flourishing, and, 
to a lesser extent, natural teleology, but her adoption comes with two crucial 
qualifications.  These qualifications, I suggest, act as a double-edged sword for 
Nussbaum’s use of Aristotle.   
In Frontiers of Justice, Nussbaum (2006, p. 182) grounds her argument, in part, 
on Aristotle’s “conception of the person as a political animal.”  Human beings find 
fulfillment or “the good of a human being” in relationships of justice (Nussbaum, 2006, 
p. 86). This good requires “basic political entitlements” or “capabilities” (Nussbaum, 
2006, p. 182).  Capabilities mark Nussbaum’s attempt to account for the shortcomings of 
Rawls’s contractarianism by incorporating an Aristotelian commitment to an 
acknowledged common good.  Nussbaum’s appropriation of Aristotle, however, comes 
with two qualifications.  First, Nussbaum (2006, p. 182) rejects Aristotle’s “single idea 
of flourishing.”  Nussbaum’s common good is “an idea of a space for diverse 
possibilities of flourishing” – an ethic that embodies human dignity, but stops short of 
hindering pluralism.  Second, Nussbaum (2006, p. 79) deemphasizes proper human 
functioning, arguing “that the appropriate political goal is capability and not function.”   
Nussbaum’s two qualifications allow her to emphasize a type of social justice 
infused with an abstract concept of human flourishing.  They preclude, however, 
meaningful discussion of that flourishing’s character or the habits necessary to achieve 
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it.  This is the case, in part, because of Nussbaum’s effort to respect pluralism.  To 
achieve this, Nussbaum removes excellence from flourishing, and ignores the driving 
force of Aristotle’s ethics, identifying the best life and explaining how to pursue it.  The 
result is an Aristotelianism of malleable abstractions separated from everyday social 
interaction, which I call Abstract Aristotelianism.  Nussbaum’s Aristotelianism provides 
support for moving beyond Rawls’s account of justice, but offers little guidance about 
what human beings are to do with their capabilities to pursue human flourishing. 
The next appropriator, William Galston, shares much in common with Nussbaum 
in that both thinkers use Aristotle as a way to thicken liberal principles, particularly John 
Rawls’s social contract theory.15  Galston works toward this end in what I call his 
Intuitive Aristotelianism.  Galston’s Intuitive Aristotelianism, most clearly articulated in 
Justice and the Human Good (1980, p. x) and Liberal Purposes (1991), attempts to find 
“a place for individuality and totality, for temporal particularity and atemporal 
generality.”   Galston’s (1980, p. xi) project is “an attempt….to show that although our 
ruling ideas are anything but Aristotelian, many of our experiences and intuitions are.”   
Galston uses Aristotle’s philosophy to identify the instincts, inclinations, and intuitions 
of modern liberal society. This modern liberal society and the political theories created 
within it, Galston (1991, pp. 142-143) argues, are informed by Aristotle’s basic insight 
                                                 
15
 It is important to note that Rawls’s social contract theory is currently the dominant 
mode of political theory.  While certainly not orthodox Rawlsians, Galston and 
Nussbaum represent a movement within the Rawlsian intellectual camp that recognizes 
the inadequacies of liberal principles and attempts to fortify them.   
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that “no political community can exist simply on the basis of diversity or of natural 
harmony; every community must rest on – indeed, is constituted by – some agreement 
on what is just.”  This insight represents “a tradition” inherited by liberalism (most 
recently, Rawls and his adherents).   
Aristotle, for Galston (1991, p. 143), provides the philosophical rationale for our 
desire for “social unity” in pluralistic modern society. Aristotle also serves as the 
paragon of political philosophy properly understood.  To explain, Aristotle reveals to 
contemporary political theory its roots, its proper self-understanding, its true goal, 
“truth-based political evaluation” (Galston, 1991, p. 154).    
 Despite his acknowledgement of Aristotle’s influence, Galston adopts Aristotle’s 
broad conclusion that a stable, beneficial political community should agree on what is 
good for its citizens, but he juxtaposes Aristotle’s catalogue of virtues with liberal 
virtues.   While it is certainly accurate that Aristotle provides an excellent philosophical 
explanation of our natural, human desire (and necessity) for community, Galston’s use 
of Aristotle is too vague and too broad.  In many ways, Galston’s Intuitive 
Aristotelianism adopts Aristotle as “rhetorical support for a particular aspect” of his 
argument, rather than offering a sincere evaluation of Aristotle’s moral-political theory.  
Galston (1991, p. 168) attempts to describe “liberal goods,” but his use of Aristotle only 
allows him to argue that “our understanding of the human good reflects the contingent 
but pervasive and enduring features of our bodily constitution, our emotions, our need 
for society, and our rationality.”   
 24 
 
 
Here, again, Galston (1991, p. 170) shares much with Nussbaum in that he 
attempts to provide a theory of the human good that deals with “conditions, capacities, 
or functionings, not just internal states of feeling.”  Where Nussbaum would exclude 
function, however, Galston (1991, p. 173) includes the concept, arguing that his account 
of the good attempts “to capture best the intuitions about well-being that underlie liberal 
societies.”  These intuitions, it seems, concern virtue and the dilemma, recognized by 
Aristotle and now faced by liberal society, that individual virtue and communal virtue 
often conflict (Galston, 1991, p. 219). Galston works to found individualistic virtue on a 
social/communal intuition, using Aristotle as a foundation for his efforts, but he stretches 
Aristotle’s insights beyond their limits.   
Where Nussbaum’s project is ultimately too abstract and Arendt’s project too 
narrow, Galston’s use of Aristotle makes his project too broad – that is, Galston’s 
Intuitive Aristotleianism seems to be a mile wide, but only an inch deep.  To be clear, 
this observation does not nullify Galston’s project.  It does, however, suggest that 
Galston’s project might be strengthened by a more restrained application of Aristotle’s 
political philosophy.  Modified Aristotelianism, Alasdair MacIntyre’s use of Aristotle, 
represents such restraint. 
 MacIntyre’s Modified Aristotelianism is articulated in After Virtue, Whose 
Justice? Which Rationality?, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, and Dependent 
Rational Animals.  MacIntyre uses Aristotle’s ethical theory, metaphysical biology and 
concept of the common good to construct an Aristotelian virtue-ethic with two 
components: (1) independent/autonomous virtues (those discussed in Aristotle’s 
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philosophy), and (2) virtues of acknowledged dependence.  The virtues of acknowledged 
dependence represent the core of MacIntyre’s modification of Aristotle’s philosophy.   
MacIntyre (1999, p. 7) argues that criticism levied against Aristotle for his 
political exclusion and elitism stem from the natural dissatisfaction with Aristotle’s 
emphasis on being autonomous and denigration of humankind’s “animality, 
vulnerability, and dependence.”  For MacIntyre, Aristotelianism is capable of 
transcending this limitation. Indeed, MacIntyre claims that the resources for fixing this 
incorrect priority exist within Aristotle’s philosophy.  To make this argument, MacIntyre 
(1999, p. 127) rejects the megalopsychos as the “paragon of the virtues.” This rejection 
becomes necessary, according to MacIntyre (1999, p. 1), when we admit to ourselves 
that “human beings are vulnerable to many kinds of affliction and…It is most often to 
others that we owe our survival, let alone our flourishing.”  We owe our survival to 
others because they care for us physically and mentally, exhibiting the virtues of 
acknowledged dependence (e.g., trustworthiness, reliability, just generosity, etc.) 
necessary for meaningful community (MacIntyre, 1999, pp. 110-126).  
MacIntyre (1999, p. 110) argues that virtues of acknowledged dependence are the 
products of commonly understood rules, the foundation of our social relationships.  
These rules are the backbone of community, the existence of which is essential for the 
cultivation of virtue.  Dependent virtues – and the recognition of our dependence that 
comes through practicing them – foster the mutual respect and cooperation necessary for 
a political organization that fulfills physical, intellectual, emotional, and spiritual needs 
(MacIntyre, 1999, p. 124). In addition, dependent virtues compliment independent 
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virtues to create the communal standards of justice required for political organization.  
MacIntyre creates the virtues of acknowledged dependence (using Aristotle’s logic and 
methodology) to complete Aristotle’s catalogue of independent virtues.  This 
combination characterizes a Modified Aristotelianism, which proves more defensible 
that either Practical, Abstract, or Intuitive Aristotelianism.   
The strength of Modified Aristotelianism originates from its inclusion of a 
description of political community with guidelines for the inclusion of groups Aristotle 
summarily excludes, and its ability to address the primary inadequacy of Aristotle’s 
moral-political theory, namely, his neglect of the dependent aspects of the human 
experience.   Abstract Aristotelianism fails to provide the substance for its Aristotelian 
foundation, Practical Aristotelianism denies the substantive, ethical foundation for its 
concept of political praxis, and Intuitive Aristotelianism overestimates the breadth and 
depth of its philosophical foundation.  By contrast, Modified Aristotelianism provides an 
Aristotelian foundation and describes the ethical and social substance that foundation 
implies, extending or modifying Aristotle where necessary.   
What do these four veins of Aristotelianism tell us about Aristotle’s relevance to 
our moral-political problems?  As Wallach (1992) asked, “How are we to understand 
where we are going by turning to Aristotle?”  I propose an answer, a standard of 
defensibility – that is, political theorists can understand the potential application (and 
pitfalls) of Aristotle’s work by comparing the strength of the four common veins of 
contemporary political thought using Aristotle as their foundation.  After examining 
these versions of contemporary Aristotelianism, Practical, Abstract, Intuitive, and 
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Modified, I argue that Modified and Intuitive Aristotelianism provide the most decisive 
arguments for Aristotle’s pivotal role in contemporary political theory, and the best-
developed application of Aristotle’s insights to present-day political and ethical 
questions.   
Aristotle has much to offer the present-day moral-political world, but despite 
renewed interest in his thought, Aristotle’s insights are lost in a haze of competing 
Aristotelianisms.  By identifying the most defensible versions of contemporary 
Aristotelianism, scholars can reclaim those insights and work toward applying them to 
current debates and circumstances.  Of the four scholars I examine, the Aristotelianism 
of William Galston, which I call Intuitive Aristotelianism, demonstrates that Aristotle’s 
insights have the potential to identify and remedy the shortcomings of liberalism, but its 
adherents stretch Aristotle’s work beyond its limitations, ultimately weakening 
Aristotle’s contribution.  Similarly, Alasdair MacIntyre’s Aristotelianism, which I call 
Modified Aristotelianism, makes comparable claims to its Intuitive counterpart, but 
works within Aristotle’s arguments and methodology to provide appropriate extensions 
to his political philosophy, while appropriating his insights on excellence, community, 
and virtue to the present-day moral-political world.  
 Although I cannot offer the exact philosophical location contemporary 
Aristotelianism will lead political theory toward, I do suggest that Modified 
Aristotelianism provides the most clear theoretical path to follow.  Scholars may, of 
course, not be convinced by my argument.  Whether the substance is accepted or 
rejected, scholars should devote energy to the framework of my project to ensure 
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Aristotle’s insights are not lost in esoteric discourse.  That is, we should work toward 
identifying the most cogent, coherent, defensible appropriations of Aristotle’s work in 
contemporary political theory so that we can apply ancient wisdom to current moral-
political impasses.  
 I now turn to a more detailed exegesis of Practical, Abstract, Intuitive, and 
Modified Aristotelianism.  The thinkers I explore do not describe their Aristotelianism 
systematically; rather, it is left to the reader to piece together their use of Aristotle and 
their interpretations of his work.  I hope to fit together the pieces of Aristotle’s influence 
found over the course of each of their prolific careers, turning those pieces into a 
discernible image of each author’s Aristotelianism.
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CHAPTER II 
 PRACTICAL ARISTOTELIANISM 
 
In her appropriation of Aristotle, Hannah Arendt focuses on praxis, self-
sufficient action.
1
  Within this, Arendt affirms Aristotle’s commitment to the importance 
of politics as a feature of the human experience.  Arendt’s project, then, becomes two-
fold.  First, if politics is so important to us, then she must define politics and the 
political.  Second, she must describe what politics needs to survive.  Arendt’s answer 
takes on a deeply Aristotelian tone.  Politics is a certain type of activity and politics 
needs a certain type of activity.  As such, Arendt spends much of her work describing 
the uniqueness of praxis and relationships that facilitate praxis. 
So, what of the strengths and weaknesses of Arendt’s Practical Aristotelianism?  
Although she uses Aristotle to make her argument, Arendt unwittingly disconnects 
Aristotle’s Politics from his ethical arguments.  What does this disconnection look like? 
In her effort to put Aristotle’s terms in everyday language, Arendt translates Aristotle’s 
virtue (aretê) into her term “principle.”  Arendt’s principle, like Aristotle’s virtue, ceases 
to exist without politics, also called the public realm (1998, p. 49) . Just as Aristotle’s 
praxis and virtue are symbiotic, so Arendt’s praxis is symbiotic with principle. As a 
translated concept, however, principle takes with it pieces of Aristotle’s human 
excellence, but it also includes things like fear.  As such, the specificity and 
directionality of Aristotle’s aretê is lost; the value of virtue’s substance as a guide is lost.  
                                                 
1
 See Aristotle, Metaphysics 1064a and Nicomachean Ethics 1094a-b. 
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What Arendt creates, then, is a moral-political theory with the same goal as Aristotle’s, 
praxis, but little ethical direction for its reader.  If we are to take from Aristotle’s work 
and from Arendt’s work tips for the best actions, then Arendt’s misguided addition of 
things like fear in the concept of principle leaves us with, at best, a rudder too small for 
our moral-political boat.  In short, Arendt’s Practical Aristotelianism leaves us with 
much talk about praxis, but little idea what that praxis should look like apart from 
political interaction.  This disconnection of Aristotle’s political philosophy from its 
ethical foundation serves as the chief weakness of Arendt’s Practical Aristotelianism.   
In her writings, Hannah Arendt works to define politics (as distinguished from 
force), explain the human relationships necessary to maintain politics, and outline the 
primacy of the political to the human experience. To do this, Arendt focuses on 
Aristotle’s concept of practical reason, arguing that satisfying explanations of the human 
experiences stem from sensory experience and activity, not contemplation or the 
sanitized techniques of contemporary science.  Politics is neither art nor science, but 
activity (Arendt, 1977, p. 153).
2
  For most individuals, this activity takes the form of 
discourse and political friendship.   Arendt also takes from Aristotle the importance of 
empirics.  As such, she works to make Aristotelian arguments approachable (e.g., 
translating Aristotle’s practical reason into her concept of common sense or his virtue 
into her concept of principle).  The nuances emerge, however, when Arendt takes 
liberties in these translations.  In her effort to translate the Aristotelian concept, Arendt 
modifies it.  Arendt is not alone in this practice.  To varying degrees, Nussbaum, 
                                                 
2
 See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1094a-b.  
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Galston, and MacIntyre take similar liberties in their writings.  What emerges from these 
modifications is what I call Practical Aristotelianism and appropriation of Aristotle 
ensconcing praxis (understood as self-sufficient activity) as the keystone of politics, 
which, for Arendt, makes praxis the keystone to the human experience.  To understand 
the role of praxis in Arendt’s Aristotelianism, it is necessary to explore Arendt’s 
concepts of trust, political friendship, everyday language, principle, and her reading of 
Aristotle’s distinction between the polis and the oikos. 
 In this chapter, I examine Hannah Arendt’s Aristotelianism as articulated in The 
Origins of Totalitarianism (1973), The Human Condition (1998), Between Past and 
Future (1977), Eichmann in Jerusalem (1965), On Revolution (1963), The Life of the 
Mind (1978a, 1978b), and Crises of the Republic (1972).  Of these works, The Human 
Condition encapsulates the thrust of Arendt’s contribution to the Aristotelian tradition.  
Arendt placed Aristotle at the forefront of “the critique of liberal individualism, or of the 
modern tendency to confuse technical rationality and practical reason” (Salkever, 1990, 
p. 169).  To alleviate this confusion, Arendt set about examining practical reason, 
particularly its connection to praxis.   
To be fair, Arendt acknowledges a number of influences apart from The 
Philosopher.  Although she utilizes Aristotle, she is an appropriator, not a disciple 
(Johnson, 2001, p. 84).  She does, however, ground her work on an interpretation of 
Aristotle’s core principles and a modification of his distinction between praxis and 
poesis (Arendt, 1998).  Man’s very humanity “is the result of…activity” (Arendt, 1977, 
p. 22).  Activity refers to praxis, Aristotle’s conceptualization of self-sufficient activity 
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or action.  It is this concept of praxis, according to Arendt, that offers the proper 
understanding of the polis and its role in the human experience.   
Praxis also facilitates acquiring the empirical knowledge, concrete, sensory 
knowledge, according to Arendt, that is necessary to satisfying explanations of the 
human experience.  Arendt (1977, p. 274) argues, 
It is perfectly true that the scientist himself does not want to go to the moon; he 
knows that for his purposes unmanned spaceships carrying the best instruments 
human ingenuity can invent will do the job….And yet, an actual change of the 
human world, the conquest of space…, is achieved only when…man himself can 
go where up to now only human imagination and its power of 
abstraction,…could reach.   
 
In short, to understand something “…we have to leave the world of our senses and of our 
bodies not only in imagination but in reality”  (Arendt, 1977, p. 274). Leaving here 
refers to the literal exiting of the earth’s atmosphere, not rejecting empirical reality or 
sensory experience.  Like gaining knowledge of space through concrete exploration, 
knowledge about man’s moral, intellectual, and spiritual abilities stems from empirical 
experience, activities a step beyond imagination and abstraction.  The inactive steps in 
the learning process remain important, but they result in a less complete understanding 
of the human condition, as Arendt would call it.  Indeed, Arendt insists that Aristotle 
missed this implication of his concept of praxis.   
Arendt equates the acquisition of abstract knowledge with pure science, 
criticizing the disconnection of abstract knowledge from practical reality or implication.  
She argues, “The scientist qua scientist does not even care about the survival of the 
human race on earth or, for that matter, about the survival of the planet itself” (Arendt, 
1977, p. 276).  Scientists, for Arendt, embody the problematic tendency of industrialized 
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liberal democracies to separate the “everyday language of…human understanding” from 
mathematical language (1977, p. 271).  Plagued by self-misunderstanding, scientists 
seek to “emancipate themselves completely from all such anthropocentric, that is, truly 
humanistic, concerns” (Arendt, 1977, p. 266).  Lest Arendt appear to be simply anti-
science, it is worth noting that she charges philosophy with the same error. She argues, 
“It lies in the nature of philosophy to deal with man in the singular, whereas politics 
could not even be conceived of it men did not exist in the plural” (Arendt, 1994, p. 443).  
In short, both science and philosophy miss the forest (community and politics) for the 
trees (individuals). 
Liberation from these concerns begins when individuals renounce everyday 
language.  This allows individuals to focus on sensory experiences and use common 
sense to arrive at half-truths.  Multiple half-truths slowly combine to create 
“sophisticated conceptual refinements” that remain “bound to the world of the senses 
and our common sense” (Arendt, 1977, p. 266).  This type of science, whether it leads to 
nuclear energy or sends men to the moon, creates two classes of citizens: the few 
scientists “whose superior knowledge entitles them to rule the many, namely all non-
scientists, laymen…be they humanists, scholars, or philosophers” (Arendt, 1977, p. 268).   
Arendt opposes this social stratification, but not stratification broadly considered.  In a 
discussion of the rise of mass culture, Arendt argues, “As long as society itself was 
restricted to certain classes…the individual’s chance for survival against its pressures 
were rather good” (Arendt, 1977, p. 200).  Again, it is not the separation of society into 
layers, but the superiority granted to so-called pure science, to which Arendt objects. 
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 Rediscovering anthropocentric concerns is not, for Arendt, the rediscovery of 
individual concerns.  “This world of ours,” Arendt (1977, p. 156) argues, “cannot afford 
to give primary concern to individual lives and the interests connected with them; as 
such the public realm stands in the sharpest possible contrast to our private domain.”  
Individual freedom is not the focus, but rather “the freedom of the world.” Arendt 
criticizes the contemporary public realm for misunderstanding liberty.  The world 
benefits from “freedom as virtuosity” – that is, a freedom “tangible in words that can be 
heard, in deeds which can be seen, and in events which are talked about,” rather than the 
modern understanding of individual freedom (1977, pp. 154-155).  Although she refers 
to tangible freedom as ancient, it is, in fact, Aristotelian.  To explain, Aristotle rejects the 
Platonic (and Socratic) claim that virtue is knowledge and ignorance vice.
3
 As such, this 
tangible freedom is not simply ancient, but the work of a particular philosopher of 
antiquity, Aristotle. The link Arendt establishes between our senses and tangible 
freedom is one she inherited from Aristotle, whose concept of virtue, a hexis acquired 
through repeated action, not thought or knowledge.
4
 Arendt’s appropriation of 
Aristotle’s hexis focuses on the term “principle.”5  A hexis of virtue “becomes fully 
manifest only in the performing” (Arendt, 1977, p. 152).  Principles, however, include 
                                                 
3
 For one example of Plato’s claim, see Republic 350d-e. See Nicomachean Ethics 
1105b15-1106a10 for Aristotle’s rejection. 
4
 See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1103a30-1103b5. 
5
 Arendt attempts to put all her arguments in everyday language, sometimes to the 
detriment of specificity. 
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more than the traditional, positive virtues (e.g., courage); Arendt describes fear as a 
principle, for example.  Arendt’s principles, like Aristotle’s virtues, are universal and 
both concepts inspire a variety of actions depending on the circumstance.
6
 Here lies a 
departure from Aristotelian thought for Arendt; principles are content-based, but she 
does not provide a classification standard for principles.  The core of the concept, 
however, remains distinctly Aristotelian; to be a thing (e.g., courageous), you must act 
courageously.  Arendt applies this logic to freedom: “Men are free…as long as they act” 
(1977, p. 153). 
Here, Arendt reveals the importance of trust.  First, individuals must trust their 
senses; they must trust their own experience.  This comes through praxis, but is 
completed through “the specific and irreplaceable in-between” among men living in 
community and engaging in exchanges of judgment (Arendt, 1968, pp. 4-5).  The 
completion separates the common experience from individual experiences, often marked 
by idiosyncrasies (Arendt, 1977, p. 223).  These idiosyncrasies need not be rejected out 
of hand, but they should be recognized.  Friendship describes the second level of 
Arendt’s trust. Without the “in-between” or the exchange, thinking becomes impossible.  
Friendship, characterized by trust, is political; it is public and can only exist through the 
sharing of experience (Arendt, 1968, p. 24).  Friendship begins with shared taste 
judgments, but must develop into “the constant interchange of talk….concerned with the 
common world” (Arendt, 1968, p. 24). This occurs, Arendt admits, within the 
boundaries of our limited linguistic capacity to describe our sensory experience, but it 
                                                 
6
 See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1106b20-25. 
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occurs nonetheless.
7
  The limits of our linguistic capacity may be overcome (or at least 
overcome to the best of our abilities) by using everyday language, rather than employing 
jargon.  Among other things, the use of jargon by scientists and bureaucrats creates the 
type of social-stratification Arendt deplores.  
Acting on principles, exchanging taste judgments, and establishing trust are 
events that occur within a broader conceptual framework Arendt creates.  This 
framework stems from Arendt’s use of a particular reading of Aristotle’s distinction 
between the polis and the oikos (household) to ground her interpretation of praxis.  The 
public realm (polis) and the private realm (oikos) stand in partial opposition to each 
other, separated by a “gulf between the sheltered life in the household and the merciless 
exposure of the polis” (Arendt, 1998, p. 35).  While the polis  “…was brought about by 
man’s need to overcome the mortality of human life and the futility of human deeds,” 
the oikos embraces mortality and actions undertaken as a means to the end of survival 
(Arendt, 1977, p. 71).  While the oikos originates from physical necessity, the polis 
springs from psychological longings.   
The psychological impetus for creating the polis stems from our desire to express 
(or disclose) our individuality to others, to have an audience for our actions (praxis) and 
our speech (logos).  For Arendt, this is the crux of Aristotle’s conceptualization of man 
as a political animal; the polis builds on the oikos.  She (Arendt, 1998, p. 177) writes, 
“With word and deed we insert ourselves into the human world” of the public realm.  
                                                 
7
 Arendt (1968, p. 25) cites the heterogeneous population of Rome and the subsequent 
difficulties of cultivating friendship.  
 37 
 
 
The polis “rises directly out of acting together….Thus action not only has the most 
intimate relationship to the public part of the world common to us all, but is the one 
activity which constitutes it” (Arendt, 1998, p. 198). Spoken disclosure (Arendt uses 
word, speech, and logos interchangeably) seems less controversial for Arendt than deed 
(also called action, activity, and praxis).   
When discussing the activity of exchanging taste judgments, Arendt describes the 
unique, practical character of the polis.  Rather than emphasizing proofs, the polis 
concerns itself with judgment and decision.  Arendt argues these concerns require “the 
judicious exchange of opinion about the sphere of public life and the common world, 
and the decision what manner of action is to be taken in it” (1977, p. 223).  This 
exchange, impossible without speech, allows men to avoid physical and intellectual 
coercion; Arendt labels the latter “coercion by truth” (1977, pp. 222-223).  Intellectual 
coercion emphasizes “compelling proof” rather than taste.  Taste is a type of judgment 
concerned with “the world…not man” (Arendt, 1977, p. 222).  This criticism is echoed 
by Arendt in her condemnation of contemporary science’s failure to focus on man writ 
large. 
 Political persuasion, a process of comparing taste judgments, is now 
misunderstood as arbitrary preference or private feelings.  In contemporary society, taste 
judgments must be private and arbitrary because “the modern period has dethroned the 
sense of what concerns everyone” (Arendt, 1994, p. 20).  This is the modern mistake that 
could be fixed, according to Arendt, by looking to and applying Aristotelian insights. 
Building on the primacy of the political found in Aristotle, Arendt argues that a person 
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offering and comparing taste judgments “discloses to an extent also himself, what kind 
of person he is,” which establishes his place in the community (1977, p. 223).  This is 
the case because, in order to be intelligible, the judgments must remain within the 
bounds of common sense.  Rather than expressing arbitrary, private preference with no 
standard for intelligibility, this person is expressing something inherently public, 
inherently shared, and inherently political.  In short, when someone expresses a taste 
judgment they are participating in peitho, public, political persuasion through speech. As 
such, the contemporary world errs when it swiftly dismisses taste judgments as 
idiosyncrasies. Taste judgments allow political discourse to transcend individual 
idiosyncrasy because the material being judged is common and the tastes expressed 
foster common bonds – that is, they create the kind of political, Aristotelian friendship 
Arendt praises.  Arendt’s focus on the political community, not the individual, is clear in 
this argument, as is her Aristotelian preference for empirical knowledge. 
A type of renunciation, somewhat akin to that longed for by the scientists, occurs 
through sharing taste judgments; using judgment based on sensory experience, we 
identify and may free ourselves from “individual idiosyncracies” (Arendt, 1977, p. 223).  
As such, the generalization and detachment science pursues come not from isolated work 
in a laboratory or lone contemplation on a mountaintop, but through interaction “in the 
realm of acting and speaking” (Arendt, 1977, p. 223).  Of the three mental activities 
Arendt describes – thinking, willing and judging – thinking remains at the foundation.  
Arendt (1994, p. 441) argues, “Thinking…is a practice carried out between men rather 
than the performance of one individual in his self-chosen solitude.”  Her choice to use 
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the term performance when describing thinking is telling.  The performance and 
theatricality of politics begin with thinking, but culminate with judgment.  It is judgment 
that best exemplifies the political.  The act of judgment “most corresponds to the present 
and to the world in which we actually live” (Johnson, 2001, p. 82).  It is the sensory 
grounding of judgment that gives it its political, which Arendt understands as superior, 
flavor. 
 Storytelling is one of Arendt’s favorite examples of the interaction between 
action and speech.  Nonfiction stories help men communicate their sensory experience to 
others; they help explain “the viewpoint of common experience” and the taste judgments 
expressed within them decide “not only how the world is to look, but also who belongs 
together in it” (Arendt, 1977, p. 223) (Arendt, 1968, p. 21).  Stories, as examples of 
taste, define and work within the society’s boundaries of common sense.  Storytelling, 
for Arendt, combines three inheritances from Aristotle: virtue as resulting from the 
same, the primacy of the political, and the importance of sensory experience.  
Storytelling includes examples of principles in action, features the inherently political 
activity of taste judgment exchange, and exemplifies the characterization of politics as 
performance.   
On this last point, Arendt begins to depart from Aristotle.  She does not 
emphasize the classification of principle driven action into virtue and vice; within that, 
Arendt leaves behind Aristotle’s argument for human perfectibility.  Instead, the 
performance of politics, the sharing of taste judgments themselves, takes precedence.  As 
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Mara (1985, p. 1051) describes it, Arendt expressed “preferences for virtuosity over 
perfection.” 
With speech set aside, Arendt begins to unpack her understanding of the 
fulfilling, self-disclosing action only possible in the public realm, praxis.  For Arendt, 
praxis is best understood in opposition to poesis, making or fabricating (usually 
characterized by imitation).
8
  Arendt concludes that Aristotle uses an enormous amount 
of intellectual energy in his “emphatic attempts to distinguish between action and 
fabrication,” but his logic left the distinction weak (1998, p. 196).9  Taking up the 
mantle, Arendt attempts to realize Aristotle’s intention and builds a political theory 
based, in part, on a dichotomous understanding of praxis and poesis.
10
   
The supremacy of praxis is established by Aristotle’s synonymous usage of 
eudaimonia.  Arendt (1998, p. 193) claims, “To be eudaimon and to have been 
eudaimon, according to Aristotle, are the same, just as to live well (eu dzen) and to have 
lived well are the same….they are not states or activities which change a person’s 
quality.”  Here, Arendt (1998, p. 193) equates unique personality, a person’s 
“unchangeable identity,” with Aristotle’s conceptualization of eudaimon and argues that 
immortality, a lasting impression of a person’s essence, is only achievable by “a man 
                                                 
8
 See Aristotle, Metaphysics 1048b23. 
9
 See also (2008); Nederman (2014), (2008), and (1994).  
10
 Arendt would object to my description of her work as a political theory.  I use the term 
in the sense that continuity exists across her many works, particularly regarding her use 
of Aristotle.  See Johnson (2001, p. 56) for a more detailed discussion. 
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who does not survive his one supreme act.”  This man “remains the indisputable master 
of his identity and possible greatness”; only he achieves total “self-disclosure as the 
expense of all other factors” (Arendt, 1998, p. 194).  Only the polis provides a venue for 
such self-disclosure through the “sharing of words and deeds.” 11 In short, the actions 
necessary to self-disclose our permanent selves remain possible only in the polis or 
public realm (Arendt, 1998).  The public realm, then, is a venue for politics as type of 
performance.  
Aristotle insists on the supremacy of the polis to the oikos because the former 
“was supposed…to multiply the chances for everybody to distinguish himself, to show 
in deed and word who he was in his unique distinctness” (Arendt, 1998, p. 198). Thus, 
praxis stands apart from poesis because the latter’s valuation requires a separate good or 
end.  Praxis, in contrast, lacks this “work product” (Arendt, 1998, p. 207).  Instead, 
praxis “can be likened to such activities as healing or navigation, where, as in the 
performance of the dancer…the product is identical with the performing act itself” 
(Arendt, 1998, p. 207). Aristotle labels action in the public realm “ergon tou anthropou 
(the ‘work of man’ qua man)…defined as ‘to live well’” (Arendt, 1998, p. 207).12  
Poesis, or fabrication, is the private, imitative art of making (Arendt, 1998, p. 179).  
                                                 
11
 See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1126b12. 
12
 Arendt (1998, p. 206) acknowledges the problem created by Aristotle’s prioritization 
of the contemplative life in Book X of Nicomachean Ethics by stating, “It is of no 
importance in our context that Aristotle saw the highest possibility of “actuality” not in 
action and speech, but in contemplation and thought, in theoria and nous.” 
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Praxis, in contrast, “takes places in a public arena and must be witnessed by others” 
(Fry, 2009, p. 45). In addition, the work product of poesis, as Arendt reads Aristotle, is 
often an imitation or reproduction, not a unique, spontaneous creation.   
Poesis, then, lacks the spontaneity and trust of praxis.  Those engaged in poesis 
imitate, following a predictable pattern to a known outcome, extending trust only to the 
pattern, not to their fellows.  As such, Arendt distinguishes art from action on two fronts: 
1) action is unpredictable and unique to the actor, and 2) actions do not exist 
independently from the actor(s), while an art product is independent from its maker.  
Given the second distinction, Arendt (1977, p. 153) argues that “politics is the exact 
opposite of an art.”  “Political institutions,” for Arendt (1977, p. 153), “depend for their 
continued existence upon acting men.” If politics is this spontaneous, public action that 
compromises our humanity, what does this action look like?  What does politics as 
praxis look like? 
To describe politics as praxis, Arendt focuses on Aristotle’s work on choice, 
particularly his emphasis on adaptability.  She draws from Aristotle’s argument that 
actions have “nothing fixed or invariable about them.”13  They are “suited to the 
circumstances.”14 Described by Arendt as “ventures,” these actions exemplify initiative 
and creativity.  As such, they leave the actor vulnerable.  Nurturing public realms 
                                                 
13
 See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1104a1. 
14
 See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1104a4, 1094b23. Arendt also references 
Machiavelli’s virtu and fortuna to illustrate this point (1977, p. 153). 
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cultivate trust among actors.  This “trust in people,” according to Arendt, “…is difficult 
to formulate but fundamental” (1994, p. 23). 
Arendt (1994, p. 118) readily addresses what she identifies as contradictions in 
Aristotle’s work, namely, a “makeshift” concept of authority using examples from “the 
prepolitical sphere.”  The problem of his “glaringly contradictory statements” stems 
from the absence of authority in the Greek political experience.  Aristotle, according to 
Arendt, plucked this new concept, authority, from the clouds of philosophy, so to speak, 
forcing The Philosopher to rely on “specifically unpolitical experiences” for justification 
(Arendt, 1994, p. 119). Here, again, Arendt emphasizes the superiority (perhaps even 
finality) of sensory experience to abstraction.  Thus, Arendt holds Aristotle’s theoretical 
feet to the fire by demanding he follow-up on his insistence that empirical evidence 
remain the standard by which we judge political organization (1994, p. 116). 
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CHAPTER III 
 ABSTRACT ARISTOTELIANISM 
 
In this chapter, I examine Martha Nussbaum’s Aristotelianism as articulated in 
her explanation of the ‘capabilities approach.’  As with Arendt’s work, I am not offering 
standards for the proper interpretation of Aristotle nor criteria to determine whether or 
not Nussbaum is an Aristotelian.  Instead, I identify the core of Nussbaum’s 
Aristotelianism – that is, the elements of Aristotle’s argument that Nussbaum places in 
the foreground.  I then explore the prevailing criticisms of Nussbaum’s Aristotelianism.  
These criticisms, in my view, do not address the crucial weakness in her appropriation of 
The Philosopher.  While Nussbaum adopts Aristotle’s commitment to human sociability, 
human flourishing, and, to a lesser extent, naturalistic essentialism, her adoption comes 
with two crucial qualificiations.  These qualifications, I suggest, act as a double-edged 
sword for Nussbaum’s use of Aristotle leaving her with an Abstract Aristotelianism 
alienated from the driving force of Aristotle’s philosophical project. 
Nussbaum’s work on Aristotle begins with her dissertation, published as 
Aristotle’s De Motu Animalium in 1978.  My exegesis, however, will not focus on her 
earlier works, because Nussbaum’s use of Aristotle has been overhauled multiple times.  
At least twice in writing, Nussbaum has set her earlier works apart from her current 
Aristotelianism.  She writes about her earlier work, “I am no longer happy with what I 
say there” (Nussbaum, 1988, p. 179).  Nussbaum chastises her critics for treating her 
pre-2000 work as “a product that is both static and coherent over time, since I feel that 
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most of what I wrote before has been definitely superseded by the new work” 
(Nussbaum, 2000, p. 103). Not all of Nussbaum’s pre-2000 work is inconsistent, 
however, with her work from the last fifteen years.  I will explore her most recent 
Aristotelianism, best captured in Frontiers of Justice (2006), along the way drawing 
from her pre-2000 writings that reveal crucial elements of Nussbaum’s Aristotelianism. 
Nussbaum’s recent use of Aristotle comes to life in the ‘capabilities approach,’ 
an Aristotelian modification of social contract theory.  Nussbaum began to develop this 
position, what she calls liberal Aristotelianism, in “Nature, Function, and Capability: 
Aristotle on Political Distribution” (1988) and “Aristotelian Social Democracy” (1990).  
In these two articles, Nussbaum rejects “Aristotle’s…reasons not to advance an 
egalitarian perfectionism” (Knight, 2007, p. 34). Nussbaum further argues that Aristotle 
provides the strongest philosophical defense of social democracy.   
Nussbaum’s argument proceeds as follows.  If the purpose of Aristotle’s polis is 
the good life and the good life requires external goods, the polis should provide these 
things to able citizens according to need (Mulgan, 2000). In short, the polis should take 
an active role in redistributing resources as necessary to ensure the able are not thwarted 
by mere circumstance.
1
  She develops this argument in “Human Functioning and Social 
Justice” (1992), where she explores Aristotle’s argument for the symbiotic relationship 
between external goods and human flourishing, contending that Aristotle’s emphasis on 
                                                 
1
 Here, Nussbaum and William Galston share an emphasis on state-directed education.  
For more on Galston’s version of civic education, see Chapter IV. 
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importance of external goods to the pursuit of internal goods provides a strong 
foundation for expanding the contractarian account of social justice.  
Nussbaum developed this connection between flourishing and need in The 
Fragility of Goodness, first published in 1986. Here, her journey with Aristotle takes a 
more personal turn (2001).  She focuses on his treatment of human limitations, of human 
imperfection.
2
  She suggests Aristotle saw beauty and possibility in our vulnerability, 
rather than holding it in disdain.  This reading complements her use of Aristotle as the 
foundation for resource (re)distribution based on need, a political and economic system 
designed to care for a community’s weakest members.   
It is not until Frontiers of Justice, however, that Nussbaum (2006) offers an in-
depth treatment of her use of Aristotle’s philosophy as the basis for the ‘capabilities 
approach.’  Nussbaum (2006) begins this treatment with two quotes, the first from David 
Hume and the second from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.  The latter reads, “And it is 
rather peculiar to think of the happy person as a solitary person: for the human being is a 
social creature and naturally disposed to live with others.”  This statement, along with 
Aristotle’s famous assertion that human beings are political animals, represents the core 
                                                 
2
 On this point, Nussbaum and Alasdair MacIntyre overlap in that both thinkers read 
Aristotle’s concept of the good life as one requiring involving intimate, vulnerable 
relationships with others.  For both Nussbaum and MacIntyre, this necessary intimacy 
and dependence, to borrow MacIntyre’s phrase, are positive parts of the human 
experience.  For more on MacIntyre’s emphasis on vulnerability and dependence, see 
Chapter V. 
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of Nussbaum’s appropriation of Aristotle’s philosophy.3  As sweeping as it is 
fundamental, Nussbaum (2006, p. 85) builds her capabilities theory upon Aristotle’s 
concept of “the human being as a social and political animal, who finds its fulfillments 
in relations with others.”  Aristotle’s “conception of the person as a political animal” is 
the linchpin of Nussbaum’s Aristotelianism (2006, p. 182).   
Capabilities, according to Nussbaum, are the ten basic qualities, guarantees, 
freedoms, etc. necessary to live a dignified, human existence.  These capabilities include 
life, bodily health, bodily integrity, senses/imagination/thought, emotions, practical 
reason, affiliation, living with other species, play, and control over one’s environment 
(Nussbaum, 2006).  Each capability, Nussbaum argues, is best (and most pragmatically) 
defended by an Aristotelian alteration to Rawlsian social contract theory.  In short, the 
dominant mode of social contract theory is lacking two things that, according to 
Nussbaum, only Aristotle can deliver.  The first of these is our self-understanding as 
social/political creatures, and the second is an acknowledged common good through 
which we understand, categorize, and govern our interactions. 
Nussbaum’s adoption of Aristotle’s conception is three fold.  First, human beings 
require, seek, and enjoy social interaction and social cohesion.  This might best be 
explained by the capabilities of affiliation and emotions.  Guaranteeing the capability of 
affiliation translates into citizens “being able to live with and toward others, to recognize 
and show concern for other human beings, to engage in various forms of social 
interaction” (Nussbaum, 2006, p. 77).  The capability of emotion is the ability “to have 
                                                 
3
 See Aristotle, Politics 1253a1-3.   
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attachments to things and people outside ourselves; to love those who love and care for 
us, to grieve at their absence; in general, to love, to grieve, to experience longing, 
gratitude, and justified anger” (Nussbaum, 2006, p. 77).   
Second, human beings are human animals, “whose human dignity, rather than 
being opposed to this animal nature, inheres in it, and in its temporal trajectory” 
(Nussbaum, 2006, p. 87).  Nussbaum (2006, p. 89) describes our distinctly animal nature 
as one of “asymmetrical dependence” during “certain phases” of our lives.  Our 
neediness illuminates a core inadequacy of social contract theories that understand 
“basic political principles as the result of a contract for mutual advantage” (Nussbaum, 
2006, p. 98).  Nussbaum combines this reading of Aristotle’s famous assertion with his 
overarching argument for the moral purpose (and obligation) of political and social 
interaction to suggest that his principles provide a solid foundation for government’s 
provision of basic entitlements far beyond minimal political equality (Nussbaum, 1990).   
Aristotle, according to Nussbaum, is a strong choice to help move beyond the 
failure of social contractarianism (and utilitarianism) “to deal adequately” with social, 
political, and economic injustice (particularly in relation to the needs of the disabled and 
oppressed), but also with the deeper emotional needs of all citizens (Nussbaum, 1990).  
Third, despite the importance of recognizing our animal natures, human beings are 
distinct in their capacity for reason and their sociability.  This is best explained by 
Nussbaum’s discussion of the intuitive basis for the ‘capabilities approach.’   This 
intuition, Nussbaum (2002, p. 130) suggests, stems from two Aristotelian points: 
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…first, that there are certain functions that are particularly central to human life, 
in the sense that their presence or absence is typically understood to be a mark of 
the presence or absence of human life.  Second,…that there is something that it is 
to do these functions in a truly human way, not a merely animal way.  
 
Nussbaum uses these two Aristotelian intuitions to develop her distinction between basic 
capabilities (e.g., adequate food, shelter, and clothing) and the higher-order capabilities 
of play, affect, imagination, etc.  Always grounding her argument on Aristotle’s 
“conception of the person as a political animal” only able to find “the good of a human 
being” in relationships of justice, Nussbaum (2006, pp. 86, 182) draws directly from 
Aristotle’s argument concerning the key differentiating characteristic of a human being, 
logos, understood both as the ability to speak and the ability to reason.
4
 Relying on 
Aristotle’s distinction, Nussbaum (2002, p. 130) argues that the true mark of human 
exercise of faculties is “infused by reasoning and sociability.” For example, the human 
use of food and drink involves perceptive (i.e., good or bad taste) and imaginative (in the 
sense of recipe creation) components, as well as fellowship, while the animal use of food 
focuses on sustenance (Nussbaum, 2002).  To exercise a faculty in a human way, then, 
requires “basic political entitlements” or “capabilities” (Nussbaum, 2006, p. 182).  To 
illustrate her point, Nussbaum describes the difference between the experience of eating 
for a starving person and for a person with adequate nutrition.  The starving man, 
Nussbaum (2002) explains, attacks the food ravenously, indiscriminately, and quickly, 
while the other man enjoys the full experience of eating, chooses what he would like to 
eat, and enjoys fellowship during the meal.  Both are engaging in the same physical 
                                                 
4
 See Aristotle, Politics 1253a5-20. 
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activity, but the one partakes in eating in the animal way, while the latter exercises his 
faculties in a human way.    
Human fulfillment or good, Nussbaum (2006, p. 182) argues, requires “basic 
political entitlements” or “capabilities.” These capabilities represent “a partial account of 
basic social justice” designed to affirm and protect human dignity (Nussbaum, 2006, p. 
182).
5
  Capabilities mark Nussbaum’s attempt to account for the shortcomings of 
Rawls’s contractarianism by incorporating an Aristotelian commitment to an 
acknowledged common good.  Nussbaum (2006, p. 66) describes this incorporation as a 
“thoroughgoing redesign of the social contract approach.”  Nussbaum steers clear of 
providing a technical definition of human flourishing or the good, but she does provide 
hints as to its content. For example, Nussbaum claims her common good is “an idea of a 
space for diverse possibilities of flourishing” – an ethic that embodies human dignity, 
but stops short of hindering pluralism.  Nussbaum (2006, p. 86) argues,  
…a central part of our own good, each and every one of us – insofar as we agree 
that we want to live on decent and respectful terms with others – is to produce, 
and live in, a world that is morally decent, a world in which all human beings 
have what they need to live a life worthy of human dignity. 
 
Second, Nussbaum (2006, p. 79) deemphasizes proper human functioning, arguing “that 
the appropriate political goal is capability and not function.”  To illustrate this point, 
                                                 
5
 Nussbaum also extends her concept of justice to non-human animals.  This aspect of 
her theory represents and interesting extension of Aristotle’s respect for nature and his 
natural teleology, but it will not be discussed here. 
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Nussbaum (2002, p. 132) states, “The person with plenty of food may always choose to 
fast, but there is a great difference between fasting and starving.”  
Nussbaum (2006, p. 86) refers to the Aristotelian foundation of her capabilities 
approach when she argues that “human beings want to live together, and they want to 
live together well, which they understand to include living in accordance with justice.”  
As social and political animals, human beings find their fulfillment or “good” in just 
social and political relationships (Nussbaum, 2006, p. 86).   
Nussbaum’s (2006, p. 182) appropriation of Aristotle’s commitment to an 
acknowledged common good, the importance of human flourishing, and human 
sociability, comes with two qualifications.  First, Nussbaum (2006, p. 182) rejects 
Aristotle’s “single idea of flourishing.”  Nussbaum’s common good is “an idea of a 
space for diverse possibilities of flourishing” – an ethic that embodies human dignity, 
but stops short of hindering pluralism.  Second, Nussbaum (2006, p. 79) deemphasizes 
proper human functioning, arguing “that the appropriate political goal is capability and 
not function.”  These two qualifications are interrelated and both are key pieces of 
Nussbaum’s Aristotelianism. After I address previous criticisms, I will discuss the 
implications of these two qualifications.    
While her Aristotelianism is most fully articulated in Frontiers of Justice, 
Nussbaum (2006, p. 95) consistently identifies the inadequacies of “social contract 
theories…in their moralized Kantian form” in her body of work.  This position, and her 
use of Aristotle to remedy those inadequacies, elicit a variety of responses from 
Nussbaum’s fellow scholars.  In a series of replies concerning ethical decision-making in 
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novels, Hilary Putnam (1983, p. 195) argues that Nussbaum misreads Aristotle (and 
Kant) when she creates a juxtaposition between Aristotelian ethics and Kantian ethics.  
Accusing Nussbaum of misreading Aristotle is a common theme, typically resulting in 
conclusions about the weakness of Nussbaum’s Aristotelian foundation.6  
For example, Nussbaum’s critics have commented that her Aristotelianism is a 
more tenuous foundation for certain arguments than she suggests. Mulgan (2000, p. 80) 
argues that Nussbaum stretches Aristotle too far in her use of his positions to advocate 
“redistribution in favor of the most socially disadvantaged.”  In short, Mulgan (2000, p. 
100) exhorts Nussbaum and others dedicated to appropriating Aristotle to advance 
liberal democratic principles to “recognize that most theories of social justice, like 
Aristotle’s, go only so far and no further.” Strobach (2001) shares Mulgan’s (2000) 
concerns about Nussbaum’s misreading of Aristotle’s comments on private property.7  
Others argue that the universalism of her capabilities approach is largely 
unsupported by Aristotle, and, in fact, using Aristotle as the foundation of her political 
theory undermines Nussbaum’s efforts (Charles, 1988). Knight (2007, p. 35) suggests 
that Nussbaum overextends “what Aristotle says of natural kinds and an inferred 
commonality of human beings to what he says of political community and the good of its 
members.”  It appears that Nussbaum fails to distinguish (as Aristotle did) between 
                                                 
6
 For highlights of this type of criticism, see Mulgan (2000), Alexander (2008), Knight 
(2007), Wallach (1992), and Arneson (2000).  
7
 See Aristotle, Politics 1262b35-1264b40. 
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connection and community.  Political community, the polis, is exclusive.
8
 Meaningful 
membership and certainly the possibility of receiving the highest intellectual and moral 
benefits are not extended by virtue of someone’s humanity. Therefore, Nussbaum’s 
claim that Aristotle provides an adequate foundation for universalism and equal 
distribution of social goods is weak.
9
 Despite this criticism, Nussbaum receives much 
praise for both the boldness of her capabilities approach as an effort to modify Rawls’s 
social contract theory and for the quality of her scholarship.
10
  Typical praise lauds 
Nussbaum’s “capabilities approach” for creating a defensible moral alternative 
recognizing individual “human needs,” while accounting for the benefits and hindrances 
created by tradition and culture (Charlesworth, 2000, p. 78).  I agree with this praise for 
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach, but I also agree with her critics that her 
Aristotelianism provides a less stable foundation for the capabilities than she suggests.   
Just as Nussbaum’s reference to the Nicomachean Ethics at the beginning of 
Frontiers of Justice (2006) provides insight into her use of Aristotle, so the opening 
comments in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics provide a similar insight into the weakness 
of Nussbaum’s Aristotelianism.  Aristotle begins his Nicomachean Ethics by insisting 
that his inquiry is fundamentally practical.  His “investigation of social and political 
matters” is a study of “the highest good” aiming to secure this highest good for 
                                                 
8
 See Knight (2007, p. 35) for a succinct explanation. 
9
 See Mulgan (2000) and Alexander (2008). 
10
 For highlights, see Harpham (2002), Holland (2008), and Fitterer (2008).  
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individuals and “a nation and for states.”11  Nussbaum fashions her project after 
Aristotle’s.  She is concerned with providing an explanation of her capabilities approach, 
an explanation she hopes will serve her ultimate goal, implementation.  Both her 
philosophy and her career reveal her interest in creating intellectual explanations to 
advance public policy goals (Harpham, 2002).  Despite Nussbaum’s goal to orient her 
work toward practical purposes, her project does not imitate Aristotle’s search for the 
highest good.  This, along with her rejection of the single concept of human flourishing, 
represents the two qualifications to Nussbaum’s adoption of Aristotle’s work.  
 These two qualifications are interrelated in that Nussbaum’s argument for a 
plurality of flourishings prohibits her from theorizing about the substance of function.  In 
an effort to stay away from imposing a singular, oppressive conception of the best life 
(thereby violating her concept of human dignity), Nussbaum overreacts by refusing to 
provide any general, substantive image of human flourishing outside of the attainment of 
the ten capabilities.  Nussbaum’s Abstract Aristotelianism provides support for moving 
beyond Rawls’s account of justice, but offers little guidance about what human beings 
are to do with their capabilities to pursue human flourishing. 
Nussbaum avoids fleshing out human flourishing or “the highest good” in favor 
of discussing the minimum entitlements of humanity.  In short, Nussbaum adopts 
Aristotle’s position on human sociability, but passes over his discussion of excellence or 
function and its role in human flourishing.  Her (2006, p. 98) emphasis on “constitutional 
                                                 
11
 See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1094a20-1094b13. 
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entitlements” and state reformation stems from her commitment to social contract 
theory, but this has serious implications for her Aristotelianism. 
Readers may argue that Nussbaum (2006, p. 1) acknowledges the very problem I 
discuss when she states, “Theories of social justice should be abstract.  They should, that 
is, have a generality and theoretical power that enables them to reach beyond the 
political conflicts of their time.”  Nussbaum’s theory certainly fulfills her own definition 
of the abstract, but it also contains deeper, undesirable abstractions about the character of 
human flourishing, namely, the exclusion of excellence and function.   
To call Nussbaum’s theory abstract, then, is to observe that she creates a 
transcendent theory, but it is also to argue that the Aristotelianism on which she founds 
that theory is, at best, substantively incomplete.  In her description of her project, 
Nussbaum (2006, p. 182) argues, “Insofar as a highly general idea of human flourishing 
and its possibilities does figure in the approach, it is not a single idea of flourishing, as in 
Aristotle’s own normative theory, but rather an idea of a space for diverse possibilities of 
flourishing.”  This openness is certainly warranted given the debate among Aristotle’s 
readers about The Philosopher’s own definition of human flourishing and the best life.12  
Nussbaum’s refusal to provide even a vague definition of human flourishing, however, is 
not motivated by this debate.  Instead, Nussbaum’s abstraction is her solution to the 
problem of preserving pluralism.  Nussbaum (2006, p. 352) argues,    
In the human case, the capabilities approach does not operate with a fully 
comprehensive conception of the good, because of the respect it has for the 
diverse ways in which people choose to live their lives in a pluralistic society.  It 
                                                 
12
 Tessitore (1992) and Bartlett (1994) provide two examples of this debate. 
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aims at securing some core entitlements that are held to be implicit in the idea of 
a life with dignity, but it aims at capability, not functioning… 
 
Nussbaum’s commitment to Rawls’s social contract theory and her effort to thicken 
Rawls’s concept of justice account for this solution, but it nonetheless leaves 
Nussbaum’s Aristotelianism vulnerable. 
 Nussbaum’s Abstract Aristotelianism would be less vulnerable if she provided 
substance to the broad Aristotelian commitments (e.g., human sociability, an 
acknowledged common good, and the importance of human flourishing) she adopts.  I 
do not presume to provide the details of that substance.  Indeed, this is my charge to 
Nussbaum.  In response, Nussbaum may note that her capabilities represent the 
beginning of a definition of human flourishing and the common good.  In this way, the 
ten capabilities could be understood to constitute the “good life” because they “promote 
the opportunity to plan a life for oneself, and to achieve emotional health, but not to 
preclude choices citizens may make to lead lives that inspire fear or involve deference to 
authority” (Nussbaum, 2006, p. 172).  Nussbaum provides a life of military service as 
one example, but what of the best life, the best function, or flourishing?  While 
protecting pluralism and revising Aristotle’s political and moral exclusions are positive 
goals, what of his concept of excellence?   
 We can be certain, should she provide some definition of human flourishing or 
excellence, that it would not meet Aristotle’s narrow criteria of “idealized rationality” 
(Nussbaum, 2006).  Indeed, Nussbaum rejects Aristotle’s obsession with intellect as the 
prerequisite for human (or animal, for that matter) dignity and fulfillment.  Efforts to 
undermine Aristotle’s exclusions by looking beyond intellectual excellence are not in the 
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purview of Nussbaum’s capabilities approach alone.  Other notable contemporary 
Aristotelians (e.g., Alasdair MacIntyre and William Galston) pursue related projects, as I 
shall show.  In Nussbaum’s understandable fervor to debunk Aristotle’s exclusivity, she, 
in turn, seems to debunk (or at least omit) any explicit concept of excellence.   
 Nussbaum might respond that the exercise of the ten capabilities represents her 
implicit concept of excellence, but this position seems theoretically dissatisfying.  Is not 
excellence, by definition, above the minimum and somehow rare?  And if the ten 
capabilities are the basic requirements and entitlements of a human existence, and the 
goal of just society, then can or should individuals even be concerned with the 
attainment of excellence?  Here, again, Nussbaum’s Aristotelianism would be fortified 
by more exploration into substance of function, flourishing and excellence.  Is 
excellence a state, national or global level construction, understood as the guarantee of 
the ten capabilities to all people?  What of individual excellence?  Are there things 
individuals can or should do with their capabilities?  If “idealized reason” is not the 
pinnacle of human existence, what are some other contenders?  Nussbaum provides 
some examples of the plurality of flourishings (e.g., choosing a life of military service 
despite its dissonance with the ten capabilities), but does little to discuss human life after 
the capabilities guarantees. 
This is not to say that Nussbaum’s Aristotelianism wholly ill-founded. Quite to 
the contrary, there is much that Nussbaum can soundly derive from Aristotle.  For 
example, Nussbaum can rely on her Aristotelianism to construct arguments supporting 
the moral purpose of politics, a flexible relationship between the polis and social groups 
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depending on the group’s intellectual, physical, and moral potential, the importance of 
external goods and education (translated by Nussbaum into the ten capabilities) to the 
polis and human fulfillment, and the possibility of everyone achieving a level of 
fulfillment/flourishing.
13
  Outside of these arguments, however, Nussbaum’s use of 
Aristotle is as controversial as it is fascinating.   
To my knowledge, the weakness I attribute to Nussbaum’s Abstract 
Aristotelianism has not been previously articulated by her critics.  Perhaps the danger of 
Nussbaum’s abstraction of an acknowledged common good from the necessary 
excellence and substantive treatment of the character of human flourishing escaped 
recognition because critics tend to emphasize whether or not Nussbaum is ‘accurately’ 
or ‘correctly’ interpreting Aristotle.14  The ‘accuracy’ of Nussbaum’s Aristotelianism is 
not my concern here.  Rather, I look within Nussbaum’s theory to identify what she 
emphasizes in Aristotle and what she constructs from that emphasis.  My criticism, then, 
is not that Nussbaum misinterprets Aristotle, but that her theory would be stronger with 
an expanded Aristotelian foundation.  In the initial phases of this work, I was of two 
minds about whether that expansion (i.e., the inclusion of some substantive treatment of 
flourishing and excellence) would be possible given Nussbaum’s interest in protecting 
                                                 
13
 Mulgan (2000, p. 85) provides these examples.  Aristotelians, by and large, consider 
these examples uncontroversial, although they differ on the details, and often flip 
Aristotle’s arguments to account for the now-commonly accepted inclusion of those 
Aristotle precluded from this intellectual and moral theory.  
14
 See Mulgan (2000), Charles (1988), and Alexander (2008) for three examples. 
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pluralism and avoiding metaphysical assertions.  A look at the work of Alasdair 
MacIntyre and William Galston, however, suggests that such expansion is possible.  In 
later chapters, I will demonstrate that Nussbaum’s intellectual weaknesses can be 
contextualized within MacIntyre’s and Galston’s work.   
It is not enough, however, to criticize Nussbaum for not being identical to other 
contemporary Aristotelians.  If I continue to argue (as I do) that her Aristotelianism 
would be strengthened by providing a definition of excellence/flourishing, then looking 
for hints of this definition within Nussbaum’s published work seems to be the next 
logical step.  Her work implies two possibilities, both of which, I argue, are 
dissatisfying.  First, the capabilities are the beginning of a good life, but when these 
capabilities are attained, individuals are free to choose lifestyles incompatible with 
certain capabilities (i.e., military service).  There is an implied hierarchy of lifestyles in 
this possibility, but it is unaddressed.  The reader is left asking what some contenders for 
the best life would be. Admitting there are a number of possibilities, in an effort to 
respect pluralism, Nussbaum should offer a few options about the best places the 
capabilities might take us.  Second, perhaps the undirected use of (or ability to use) the 
ten capabilities might itself be the best life, but this leaves us with an issue.  If we all 
have the capabilities, we necessarily reach different levels/results when we use or 
experience them, so substantive excellence is lost altogether.  In short, if whatever we 
each get when we use/experience our capabilities is the best life, then there is no best.  
Both of these possibilities, I argue, leave us with an Aristotelian absent excellence, a 
half-use of Aristotle. 
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Should she provide some definition of flourishing or excellence, Nussbaum 
would certainly not meet Aristotle’s criteria of “idealized rationality,” but there have 
been other efforts to broaden Aristotle’s “idealized rationality” excellence undertaken by 
other contemporary Aristotelians. The difference here is that Nussbaum keeps her 
Aristotlianism abstract – avoiding a definition of substance for flourishing for fear of 
paternalism and excluding discussion of function. 
While Nussbaum sees the inclusion of some substantive treatment of excellence 
into her Aristotelianism as either unnecessary or impossible, her work would be 
strengthened – that is, she would be able to access and apply Aristotle’s insights to the 
current moral-political world if she were to include this.  Nussbaum’s two qualifications 
allow her to emphasize a type of social justice infused with an abstract concept of human 
flourishing.  They preclude, however, meaningful discussion of that flourishing’s 
character or the habits necessary to achieve it.  This is the case, in part, because of 
Nussbaum’s effort to respect pluralism.  To achieve this, Nussbaum removes excellence 
from flourishing, and ignores the driving force of Aristotle’s ethics, identifying the best 
life and explaining how to pursue it.  The result is an Aristotelianism of malleable 
abstractions separated from everyday social interaction, which I have called Abstract 
Aristotelianism.  Nussbaum’s Aristotelianism provides support for moving beyond 
Rawls’s account of justice, but offers little guidance about what human beings are to do 
with their capabilities to pursue human flourishing.  Despite her passion for practicality 
and policy reform, Nussbaum’s Aristotelian foundation, characterized by the double-
 61 
 
 
edged qualifications of multiple flourishings and her de-emphasis of human functioning, 
creates a disjointed Aristotelianism hindered by abstraction.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 INTUITIVE ARISTOTELIANISM 
 
William Galston’s appropriation of Aristotle’s philosophy, which I call Intuitive 
Aristotelianism, focuses on defending liberalism.  In this chapter, I identify the 
foundation of Galston’s Aristotelianism (i.e., what he takes from Aristotle) and how he 
extends and applies Aristotle’s position.  Examining Intuitive Aristotelian allows 
political theorists to identify the most defensible version(s) of contemporary 
Aristotelianism. This identification helps scholars to reclaim Aristotle’s insights into 
political and ethical questions and to apply them to current debates and circumstances. 
When first describing his reason for turning to Aristotle to defend liberalism, 
Galston draws a bright line between liberalism and relativism.  Relativism is, for 
Galston, what most proponents of liberalism are implicitly defending.  Galston uses an 
Aristotelian framework precisely because it prevents his defense of liberalism from such 
devolution.  Galston bases his Intuitive Aristotelianism on what he calls Aristotle’s basic 
insight, our desire for “social unity” (1991, p. 143). Galston begins from the premise that 
“no political community can exist simply on the basis of diversity or of natural harmony; 
every community must rest on – indeed, is constituted by – some agreement on what is 
just” (1991, pp. 142-143).  Without Aristotle’s insight, Galston argues, the formal 
justification of liberalism becomes impossible (1982, p. 627).   
According to Galston, Aristotle also serves as the paragon of political philosophy 
properly understood.  To explain, Aristotle reveals to contemporary political theory its 
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roots, its proper self-understanding, and its goal, “truth-based political evaluation” 
(Galston, 1991, p. 154).   Galston (1982) contrasts this evaluation with the myth of 
liberal neutrality regarding individual choices, particularly those that demonstrate a lack 
of restraint and self-control.  We intuitively turn to Aristotle’s arguments to determine 
what is good for individuals: “No form of political life can be justified without some 
view of what is good for individuals.  In practice, liberal theorists covertly employ 
theories of the good” (Galston, 1982, p. 621).  As such, Galston’s Intuitive 
Aristotelianism includes a theory of liberal goods and a catalogue of liberal virtues.  
Central to these are contestability and the freedom to deliberate within a constrained 
space.  Galston does not use Aristotle to search for a single definition of the human 
good.  Instead, Aristotle provides the theoretical leverage to help Galston bolster 
liberalism as a theory that admits of human excellence, but thrives on deliberation about 
– not only definition of – that excellence.   
What, then, does Galston’s Intuitive Aristotelianism look like?  It includes two 
components: social and individual.  First, Galston constructs a theory of liberal goods to 
flesh out the definition of social unity.  He echoes Aristotle’s argument that the human 
good must be a temporal end, but modifies Aristotle’s concept by adding the criterion of 
contestability.  The criterion of contestability transforms Galston’s work from a single 
theory of the human good to a theory of multiple, sometimes competing goods.  This 
transformative addition grounds the individual component of Galston’s Intuitive 
Aristotelianism, namely, the role of deliberation in individual fulfillment.  Galston uses 
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the freedom to deliberate to protect individuals from society, but Galston also defines a 
constrained space for deliberation through a catalogue of liberal virtues.   
Galston uses an Aristotelian framework to create his liberal virtue catalogue – 
namely, Aristotle’s conceptualization of virtue as excellence and his unification of the 
virtues. An excellent, liberal individual displays a series of dispositions all falling under 
the heading of taking personal responsibility to deliberate about the human good and 
choose a life in accord with the results of that deliberation.  Individuals are understood in 
terms of their deliberative capacity and are protected in the exercise of that capacity.  
Society is understood in terms of its success in protecting individual freedom to 
deliberate balanced with its cohesiveness. Society, then, places appropriate limits on 
deliberation (i.e., on diversity) determined by an Aristotelian intuition. For example, 
individuals in a liberal society must share a commitment to noncoercion (Galston, 1991).  
We must deliberate, then, in a constrained space.  The boundaries of that constrained 
space are determined by our interest in preserving social unity. With this, Galston’s 
Aristotelian liberalism protects the individual from society and society from the 
individual. 
 How successful is Galston’s appropriation of Aristotle? What are his stronger 
and weaker uses of Aristotle’s work?  Does Intuitive Aristotelianism provide us with a 
defensible version of contemporary Aristotelianism?  While it is accurate to say that 
Aristotle provides an excellent philosophical explanation of our natural human desire 
(and necessity) for a semblance of “social unity” and community, Galston (1991, p. 168) 
adopts Aristotle as “rhetorical support for a particular aspect” of his argument, rather 
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than offering a more substantial evaluation of Aristotle’s moral-political theory.  Galston 
(1991, p. 168) attempts to describe “liberal goods,” but his use of Aristotle only allows 
him to argue that “our understanding of the human good reflects the contingent but 
pervasive and enduring features of our bodily constitution, our emotions, our need for 
society, and our rationality.”  Here, Galston (1991, p. 170) shares much with Martha 
Nussbaum in that he attempts to provide a theory of the human good that deals with 
“conditions, capacities, or functionings, not just internal states of feeling.”  Where 
Nussbaum would exclude function, however, Galston (1991, p. 173) includes the 
concept, arguing that his account of the good attempts “to capture best the intuitions 
about well-being that underlie liberal societies.”   
These intuitions, it seems, concern virtue and the dilemma, recognized by 
Aristotle and now faced by liberal society, that individual virtue and communal virtue 
often conflict (Galston, 1991, p. 219).  Galston works to found individualistic virtue on a 
shared intuition, using Aristotle as a foundation for his efforts, but he stretches 
Aristotle’s insights beyond their limits.  Where Nussbaum’s project is ultimately too 
abstract and Arendt’s project too narrow, Galston’s use of Aristotle makes his project 
too broad.  To be clear, this observation does not nullify Galston’s project.  It does, 
however, suggest that Galston’s project might be strengthened by a more specific 
application of Aristotle’s political philosophy.  To explore the strengths and weakness of 
Intuitive Aristotelianism, we should first turn to Galston’s concept of social unity, his 
adoption of Aristotle’s most basic insight. 
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 Galston’s argument begins with his assertion that Aristotle’s philosophy affords 
us the intuition behind modern liberal society.  This intuition is our desire for social 
unity.  Social unity implies neither relativism nor homogeneity.  Galston (1991, p. 99) 
argues for “wide diversity” with a commitment to “some limits on diversity are not only 
compatible with, but required by, a liberal order.”  The liberal pluralism Galston (1991, 
p. 143) supports requires any defense of liberalism to make “truth claims” – in short, 
social unity is not merely similarity in behavior, but the conscious concurrence with 
acknowledged truth.  These truths provide “the core meaning and purpose” of life, but 
Galston (1991, pp. 147, 154) is careful to distinguish between widespread agreement on 
an issue and the discovery of truth.   
Drawing upon Aristotle, Galston’s concept of truth is transcultural.  Commitment 
to noncoercion represents one example. Noncoercion is a discovered truth about which 
widespread agreement exists, making it a truth claim (Galston, 1991, pp. 143, 155).  
Galston uses noncoercion and individual freedom synonymously. He is careful to note 
that if we are looking for social unity based on truth claims about human goods and a 
moral order, “the freedom to choose one’s own conception of the good is among the 
highest-order goods” (Galston, 1991, p. 145). 
Galston is careful, however, to stop short of permanently linking the social unity 
we experience via a commitment to individual freedom (and institutions that support it) 
to democratic society.  Here, Aristotle proves a valuable resource.  In his hesitance to 
limit the sources and foundation of individual freedom, Galston cites practices found in 
contemporary liberal societies that otherwise affirm a broad understanding of individual 
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freedom.  Juries, lifetime tenure for federal judges, seat belt laws, and the criminalization 
of suicide are among Galston’s examples.  Perhaps the most illuminating, however, is 
Galston’s interpretation of President Abraham Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus 
protections.  According to Galston (1991, p. 87), President Lincoln’s refusal to ask the 
U.S. Congress for permission to suspend this protection reveals that 
…there are considerations based on the common good of a political community 
that can justify the violation of otherwise binding democratic norms.  Just as the 
“good life” depends on “mere life,” so too does a good ordering of the political 
community depend on the physical existence and integrity of that community.  
 
For Galston, President Lincoln’s decision-making process is closely linked to Aristotle’s 
understanding of society’s role in character formation.  Lincoln’s intuition could be 
trusted because of his character as revealed in actions and statements reflecting a 
constant commitment to certain political ideals, including social unity.  President 
Lincoln’s calculus, Galston argues, illustrates the role of intuition in the creation and 
protection of political community.  Positive law will be (and should be, for Galston) 
silent in certain circumstances, leaving leaders and citizens alike to rely on intuition. For 
Galston, this intuition motivates us to create and protect social unity.  In the absence of 
instructions from our system of positive law, our intuitive desire for unity motivates us 
to pursue actions in support of that end.  Lincoln’s intuition, not his legal knowledge, 
informed this and a series of future decisions ultimately preserving U.S. political 
community.    
For Galston, then, society’s visible structure is no more important than the 
intuitive commitments supporting that structure.  Galston’s use of Abraham Lincoln as 
an example of an Aristotelian principle serves three purposes.  First, Galston argues that 
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the intuitive commitment to social unity exemplified by Lincoln stems not from the 
liberal tradition’s defense of individual freedom, but from Aristotle’s robust defense of 
the importance of community to human fulfillment.  Second, Lincoln’s reliance on this 
intuitive commitment despite the limits of positive law reveals the primacy of our 
Aristotelian foundation in individual choice.  Third, our ability as a liberal society 
(through the study of history) to recognize and praise Lincoln’s choice reveals the 
pervasiveness of the Aristotelian character of our social and political commitments.  
Indeed, for Galston, not only does our description of Lincoln as moral, wise, and 
judicious reveal our Aristotelian leanings as a society, but the way we define those 
adjectives reinforces the importance of Aristotle in our understanding of society’s 
purpose and citizens’ role in it.  
If social unity is not simply a byproduct of democratic society, then how does 
social unity emerge?  For Galston, social unity only emerges from the aggregation of 
individual commitments.  At the heart of social unity are individuals’ commitments to 
one particular truth claim, a definition of the human good.  Galston begins defining the 
human good by establishing a list of standards a defensible theory of the human good 
must meet.  He refers to these criteria as background conditions (Galston, 1991, p. 166).  
First, neither society nor the individual can be fully understood in terms of the 
notion of well-being, particularly individual well-being.  Second, the good  must be 
defined apart from well-being alone – that is, the good must be universal and “of this 
world” Galston (1991, p. 167).  Third, any definition of the good must capture or create 
commonality while protecting (at a minimum, permitting) choice and diversity.  Fourth 
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and fifth, the theory of the human good is and can only be understood as a collection of 
“ends…conditions, capacities, or functionings, not just internal states of feelings” 
(Galston, 1991, p. 170).  To explain, the theory of the good cannot be based on 
preference, but is marked by “a particular understanding of inner satisfaction (pleasure 
or gratification)” (Galston, 1991, p. 171).  Sixth, the good must be contestable and 
ultimate. Seventh (and intimately related to the third criterion) is “the radical 
heterogeneity of the human good” (Galston, 1991, p. 172).  Galston (1991) insists, 
however, that this heterogeneity does not imply that ranking interests, facts, and 
judgments become impossible.   
These background conditions are presented here in the order Galston offers them.  
If, however, we examine each condition’s connection to Galston’s Aristotelianism, then 
the second, fourth and fifth conditions have the most in common with Aristotle’s 
eudaimonia.  The second condition requires that the human good be universal and 
temporal.  In short, the good cannot be a reward found in an afterlife.  It must be 
experienced here, in our world. This echoes Aristotle’s insistence that the fulfillment 
found through virtue is not enjoyed by dead men, but is experienced through activity of 
the living, whether or not that fulfillment is “god-given.”1  
The fourth and fifth conditions provide the definition of the Aristotelian 
fulfillment Galston references. These conditions require that the theory of the human 
good be a theory of ends oriented toward a proper understanding of pleasure (Galston, 
1991, p. 171).  Simply preferring or liking something does not suffice, according to 
                                                 
1
 See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1099b-1100a15.   
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Galston.  The pleasure he references is deeper; it is Aristotelian – “the sensation of 
pleasure [that] belongs to the soul.”2 
On its face, Galston’s sixth condition appears to merit inclusion with conditions 
two, four, and five in terms of their connection to Aristotle’s work.  Galston does use 
Aristotelian terminology in part of the sixth condition, but he redefines the terms.  
Galston’s use of “ultimate” should be understood in terms of the means versus ends 
distinction combined with the term contestability. For a good to be ultimate, it must be 
the end rather than the means, but this end is contestable.  Ultimate should not be 
conceived in terms of establishing a hierarchy of goods or singular conception of the 
good.  Along with conditions one, three, and seven, it is the inclusion of contestability 
and a redefinition of the term ultimate that marks a substantial modification of 
Aristotle’s concept of the good on Galston’s part. 
 What, then, does Galston’s liberal theory of the human good look like?  Although 
he includes within it life, normal development of basic capacities, fulfillment of interests 
and purposes, society, and subjective satisfaction, the connection between freedom and 
rationality proves to be the essential component of Galston’s (1991, pp. 174-176) human 
good.  He draws this from Aristotle’s understanding of deliberation, specifically, 
Aristotle’s insistence that we deliberate about “things that are in our power and can be 
realized in action;…For in addition to nature, necessity, and chance, we regard as causal 
principles intelligence and anything done through human agency.”3 
                                                 
2
 See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1099a5-10.     
3
 See Nicomachean Ethics 1112a30-40. 
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Galston’s also affirms the value of life and the importance of physical, mental 
and emotional health (e.g., the ability to speak and interact).
4
  Here, he adopts Aristotle’s 
idea of external goods as conditions for human flourishing.
5
  In addition, Galston’s 
(1991, p. 175) liberal human good views human beings as striving, purposive creatures 
who thrive in the “network of significant relations we establish with others” and enjoy 
the freedom of “self-assertion or self-determination.” This freedom should be 
accompanied by our ability “to take satisfaction in a life marked by real personal 
accomplishments and positive relations with others” (Galston, 1991, p. 177). 
 The existence and affirmation of a human good is something Galston inherits 
from Aristotle’s work.  The keys to Galston’s modification of Aristotle’s telos, however, 
are contestability and choice (or freedom).   Galston echoes Aristotle’s argument that 
“choice involves reason and thought,” but he is hesitant to do more than provide a basic 
                                                 
4
 Galston is silent on the role of the disabled in political community.  He does affirm the 
value of life in and of itself, but he stops short of exploring the fulfillment potential of 
individuals who lack the ability to reason, speak, or otherwise meaningfully engage with 
their fellows. Galston emphasizes the intellectual, rather than emotional interactions 
between citizens.  In the next chapter, I will explore the way in which Alasdair 
MacIntyre approaches the question of disabled citizens’ participation in and contribution 
to the community.  Unlike Galston, MacIntyre addresses this question directly and works 
to create a theoretical foundation for the inclusion of individuals who were either 
ignored or marginalized in competing Aristotelian projects. 
5
 See Nicomachean Ethics 1099a30. 
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framework of the good within which choices should be made.
6
  In short, Galston does 
not follow Aristotle as he searches for the highest good.  Galston works to define a 
liberal human good, but providing a specific robust definition that transforms the human 
good into an illiberal concept.  The challenge, then, as Galston sees it, is to create a 
framework within which individuals may build and deliberate about sometimes 
competing, sometimes contradictory, but sometimes wholly compatible, versions of the 
good.  This framework allows individuals to strike a balance between contestability and 
choice.   
Working within the framework of the liberal human good, I may defend my 
concept of the good and my fellows may defend their concepts.  When taken together, 
these individual goods and our ability to defend them (regardless of the quality of the 
defense) exemplify the liberal human good in that they were created and chosen freely 
by individuals.  Galston is less concerned that individual understandings of the human 
good be defensible than that individuals have the ability (he comes close, here, to using 
the term right) to defend them.  This feature of the human good framework might be 
appropriately called procedural defensibility.
7
   
                                                 
6
 See Nicomachean Ethics 1112a15-18. 
7
 What about understandings of the human good that conflict with the broad framework 
of the liberal human good?  Galston (2002, p. 44) argues, “Those who invoke 
comprehensive doctrines against democratic governance and liberties must be met on 
their own ground; the evidence provided by those doctrines cannot be ruled out as 
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This difference between Galston and Aristotle stems, in part, from their 
competing concepts of justice.  For Galston, procedural justice – equal opportunity and 
treatment – reigns supreme over substantive justice – justice according to desert.  
Galston, then, sees Aristotle’s argument for a single telos as anti-liberal and rejects this 
component of Aristotle’s thought in the same way he rejects Aristotle’s understanding of 
true justice.  Galston, however, is willing to classify portions of Aristotle’s telos (e.g., 
rationality) as essential, but he remains unwilling to adopt an exclusionary concept of 
telos.  
As Galston (1991, p. 220) understands it, a liberal society is organized under 
constitutional government and the market economy, praises individuality and diversity, 
asserts the primacy of individual rights, and prioritizes privacy protections to that end.  
Liberal society must not only have these features, but it must be committed to the 
principles embodied within them. Given that, Aristotle serves as the foundation for 
Galston’s (1982, p. 627) argument that “the polity must commit itself to specific views 
of human personality and right conduct.”  How does a society embody and perpetuate 
this commitment? Civic education. Civic education is the instrument the state uses to 
enforce its definition of right conduct.  While Galston values the individual, he 
nevertheless grants society a robust role in the individual’s character formation.  This 
robust role is one he adopts from Aristotle. 
                                                                                                                                                
inadmissible. The alternative is stubborn silence, a kind of democratic dogmatism that ill 
serves both theory and practice.” 
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Liberal society’s “public education…should focus on the core requirements of 
competent economic, social, and political performance expected of all citizens” 
(Galston, 1991, p. 298).  This civic education is not philosophical or scientific.  It is not 
interested in pursuing truth or developing an ethic of inquiry.  The kind of civic 
education liberal societies need, Galston (1991, p. 243) argues, molds “individuals who 
can effectively conduct their lives within, and support, their political community.”  Here 
are a few of the virtues civic education must impart if liberal societies are to survive: 
“the willingness to fight on behalf of one’s country; the settled disposition to obey the 
law;…independence, tolerance, and respect for individual excellences and 
accomplishments, for example” (Galston, 1991, pp. 245-246).   
The state’s role, then, is protective and pedagogical; it leads efforts of character 
formation (Galston, 1991, p. 244).  The liberal state also reflects liberal society’s truth 
claims and protects (sometimes provides) the basic “elements of individual well-being” 
(Galston, 1991, p. 166).  On this point, Galston and Nussbaum have much in common.  
In its reflective capacity, the state codifies the polity’s “more-than-minimal conception 
of the good that serves to rank-order individual ways of life and competing principles of 
right conduct” (Galston, 1982, p. 627).  While the state is not “detached from the 
promotion of excellence and the recognition of merit,” it still does not create those 
conceptions or rankings it employs.  The animating factor here is the individual and its 
aggregate, society.  Given that liberal society is the sum of its members’ commitments 
and character, Galston (1982, p. 629) then turns to his development of “a liberal theory 
of virtue.” 
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It is not enough, Galston (1982, p. 627) argues, to create a half-baked theory of 
the good based on “the easy assumption that only undeserving ways of life lose out in a 
liberal society.”8  The project must be to determine what ways of life flourish in liberal 
society.  What, then, do deserving ways of life look like?  Galston begins his argument 
by reiterating the importance of community and virtue to liberalism.  The social unity 
liberalism requires also “needs a wide range of virtues to maintain itself” (Galston, 1991, 
p. 43).     Virtues function as both ends and means in liberal society.  As means, liberal 
virtues perpetuate the features of liberal society.  Virtues as means include 
independence, tolerance, work ethic, self-control (described as “the capacity for 
moderate delay of gratification”), adaptability, imagination, initiative, reliability, civility, 
drive, determination, courage, law-abidingness, a sense of humor, loyalty, and patience 
(Galston, 1991, pp. 224-227). They also include 
…the disposition to engage in public discourse, an interest in minimizing 
hypocrisy, self-presentation, insight into individual character, perseverance, the 
ability to take criticism, willingness to admit error, the largeness of soul that 
makes possible some intuitive knowledge of and sympathy with a wide variety of 
characters… (Galston, 1980, p. 184). 
 
As ends, virtues are the activities of the excellent liberal individual. The activities 
of excellent liberal individuals are separated into three components. First, excellence is 
“rational liberty or self-direction”  (Galston, 1991, p. 229). Second, excellence is “the 
capacity to act in accordance with the precepts of duty” (Galston, 1991, p. 229).  Third, 
excellence is self-determination or “a full flowering of individuality” (Galston, 1991, p. 
230).  Aristotle’s description of excellence as activity provides the foundation for 
                                                 
8
 In contrast, Martha Nussbaum’s Aristotelianism includes this assumption. 
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Galston’s tripartiate liberal excellence.  Galston (1991, p. 230) is explicit that liberal 
excellence is “a kind of activity.”   
All liberal virtues overlap in that they rely on “a vision of individuals who in 
some manner take responsibility for their own lives” (Galston, 1991, p. 230). Here, 
Galston echoes Aristotle’s argument for the unity of the virtues, citing individual 
responsibility as the unifying theme of liberal virtue.  Although a series of later thinkers 
fill in the details of these virtues, it is Aristotle’s work that provides the groundwork for 
Galston’s concept of liberal, overlapping virtues.  First, Galston builds on Aristotle’s 
definition of excellence as activity.  Second, Galston adopts Aristotle’s argument for the 
unity of the virtues, and third, Galston reaffirms Aristotle’s assertion that  
…virtue or excellence depends on ourselves, and so does vice. For where it is in 
our power to act, it is also in our power not to act…if we have the power to act 
nobly or basely, and likewise the power not to act, and if such action or inaction 
constitutes our being good and evil, we must conclude that it depends on us 
whether we are decent or worthless individuals.
9
 
 
Aristotle’s political philosophy provides the springboard for liberal conceptions of 
personal responsibility and “a vindication of the dignity of every individual” (Galston, 
1991, p. 231). The latter position is the most difficult to reconcile with a strict reading of 
Aristotle’s work.  Galston admits as much, claiming his use of Aristotle is wrought with 
tension, but effective nonetheless.  Assuaging this tension requires striking a balance 
between the minimal theory of the human good Galston (1991, p. 301) offers and “the 
full theory of the good latent in liberal practice.”  This part of the project, however, 
Galston leaves to future liberal theorists.  He instead takes up the second component of 
                                                 
9
 See Nicomachean Ethics 1113b5-15. 
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the tension created by his use of Aristotle.  Galston suggests this tension might be 
assuaged if the reader avoids conflating individual dignity with neutrality and relativism.  
Here, Galston begins his Aristotelian critique of the liberal neutrality. 
Neither liberal society nor the liberal state are neutral. Galston (1991, p. 301) 
argues,  
The strategy for justifying the liberal state that seeks to dispense with all specific 
conceptions of the good cannot succeed.  Defenders of the liberal state must 
either accept the burden of inquiry into the human good or abandon their 
enterprise altogether. 
 
Creating a specific definition of the human good demands that the liberal state 
“inevitably limit and shape the human possibilities it contains” (Galston, 2002, p. 26).  
Liberal societies and the states that reflect their truth claims must, however, feature 
“degrees of openness to difference” (Galston, 2002, p. 26).  It is the liberal state’s 
function to provide “disincentives…for leading our lives in particular ways” (Galston, 
2002, p. 26).  For the liberal state to do this successfully, disincentives must be based on 
the “traditional task of political philosophy – defining and defending the difference 
between better and worse forms of political organization” (Galston, 2002, p. 45).  For 
Galston, Aristotle represents the paragon of this task.  Only in Aristotle do we find the 
combination of defensible teleology, along with a non-tautological, non-neutral 
argument for individual responsibility and social unity. Indeed, Aristotle provides the 
most defensible and articulate impetus for observations “that political communities are 
organized around conceptions of citizenship that they must defend, and also nurture 
through educational institutions; as well as less visible formative processes” (Galston, 
2002, p. 111).   
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From this reading of Aristotle, Galston works to define the state in light of the 
primacy of the individual.  The link between the state, education, and “less visible 
formative processes” remains unclear in Galston’s (2002, p. 111) work.  He is careful, 
however, to draw a bright line between “the state’s general public principles and the 
particular principles that guide…diverse subcommunities” (Galston, 2002, p. 110).  The 
subcommunities may affirm (and act on) principles that are contrary to public principles 
or public norms without content-based restrictions stemming from the state (Galston, 
2002, pp. 115-120).  The primary public norm for a liberal state should be “feasible 
accommodation of diverse legitimate ways of life, limited only by the minimum 
requirement of civic unity” (Galston, 2002, p. 119).  This requires participants “to 
experience…[a potential principle] clash imaginatively as part of a process that could 
create a wide shared understanding” (Galston, 2002, p. 117).   
 Galston’s distaste for neutrality, however, should be read with his rejection of 
Aristotle’s single (exclusionary) telos in mind.  It is precisely the project of determining 
the boundaries of the inclusivity – that is, outlining the framework – for the human good 
with which Galston charges himself.  Galston, then, is careful to avoid offering a lead 
role to the state or the community in defining the human good.  Instead, this is left to 
individuals as they articulate their preferences through “public choices” and deliberation 
(Galston, 2002, p. 130).  The state and the community, preferably the community for 
Galston, should instead protect the framework.   
Communities and states are different in that communities are loosely organized 
according to intuition and latent commitments, while states feature institutions and legal 
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frameworks.  To use terms related to Galston and Aristotle’s ideas of justice, only the 
individual should be involved in substantive constructions of the human good.  The state 
and community should focus on facilitating the construction and maintenance of the 
framework within which individuals may create their own substantive definitions. The 
state best equipped to accomplish this task is Galston’s liberal pluralist state.  Here, the 
difference between pluralism and relativism becomes central to Galston’s argument.  
Galston (2002, p. 1) stops short of using Aristotle’s work to “reduce all goods to 
a common measure or create a comprehensive hierarchy among goods,” but he does 
argue “that value pluralism does not degenerate into relativism.”  He makes this claim by 
establishing a foundation (or baseline, so to speak) of basic goods.  These basic goods 
“are key to any choice worthy conception of life…[within] a wide range of legitimate 
diversity of individual conceptions of good lives…and purposes” (Galston, 2002, p. 1).  
Basic goods often take the form of limitations affirmed by the community and codified 
by the state.  For example, as part of its role as protector, the liberal pluralist state must 
prohibit slavery and human sacrifice (Galston, 2002, p. 128).  The explanation for why 
the liberal pluralist state must do this and the notion of basic goods or limitations are 
nested in Galston’s concept of justice.  
Justice, in this context, is neither universal nor relative.  It is plural, multi-
dimensional, and variant.  In its broadest definition, justice is the force that enables 
societies to remain well-ordered.   As a means to social order, Galston echoes Aristotle’s 
classification of justice as something about which we may deliberate.
10
 The demands of 
                                                 
10
 See Nicomachean Ethics 1112b5-10.  
 80 
 
 
the society, then, determine the scope and content of justice.  For example, societies may 
differ in what they classify as a need or a want.  These differences “reflect not only the 
permanent conditions of human life and flourishing but also the community’s specific 
economic and social circumstances” (Galston, 2002, p. 129).  To protect individual 
freedom and a community’s freedom of self-determination, justice must be understood 
as plural concept – that is, a flexible construct constrained not by a universal definition, 
but by basic or broad limitations.  According to Galston (2002, p. 130), “There is no 
general theory that obliges particular communities to resolve…matters [of justice] in a 
uniform fashion; there is wide scope for legitimate variation.”  Diversity, then, is 
permitted in the means and ends of justice dispute resolutions.   
This diversity, Galston argues, stems from the link Aristotle makes between 
deliberation and justice.  Galston’s argument begins with a reminder that Aristotle 
describes justice as something about which we deliberate.  From this, Galston argues that 
Aristotle’s theory supports defining social unity in terms of deliberation, not agreement 
about the concept of justice.  Politics, then, as a specific type of communal deliberation 
concerning justice, is secondary to the process of deliberation. And deliberation may be 
undertaken over a wide variety of topics and claims. Galston classifies this argument as 
Aristotelian in that it is informed by Aristotle’s work, but it also represents Galston’s 
greatest deviation from Aristotle’s original theory.  Galston (2002, p. 131) argues,  
Politics would be less fragile if its claims clearly took priority over the claims of 
kinship, of self-expression, of free though, or of faith.  Politics enjoys no such 
priority, and great evils ensue when the political order seeks to exercise it.  Life 
would be simpler if there were clear rules to resolve the clashes between politics 
and its competitors. But there are not. 
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As such, Aristotle informs Galston’s (2002, p. 131) project, but that project does not 
include “strict lexical orderings among goods” placing politics above other topics of 
deliberation. Furthermore, such orderings would not address the shortcomings of liberal 
societies.  An argument for the primacy of political deliberation is not the philosophical 
leverage Aristotle provides.  Using Aristotle to create “homogenous accounts of value” 
remains tempting in that it eliminates competing claims of political authority, but it also 
takes from individuals and communities a core component of their flourishing, 
deliberation “about matters of human agency” (Galston, 2002, p. 69). It is the primacy of 
this deliberation – that is, reasonable disagreement – Galston takes from Aristotle’s 
work.   
Citing Nicomachean Ethics 1112b-1113a, Galston builds on Aristotle’s claim 
that “deliberation is the effort to choose the best course, all things considered, in 
circumstances in which reason shapes but does not fully determine the course.”  From 
this, Galston draws several conclusions.  First, more and less choiceworthy actions and 
commitments exist.  Second, which action or commitment is best depends on the 
circumstances. Third, reason does not provide formulaic guidance for our choice.  In 
short, one individual’s understanding of the circumstance differs from another’s 
understanding; therefore, what constitutes a choiceworthy action may differ.  According 
to Galston, these three components of Aristotle’s argument give us the framework for 
individual freedom, particularly the freedom to deliberate.  He (2002, p. 70) asserts 
Freedom operates…in a discursive arena in which some reasons are better than 
others but none is clearly dominant…. If ethics and politics are part of this 
zone,... then their substance will reflect this ceaseless interplay of strong but not 
compelling reasons for grappling with the variability of practical circumstances. 
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In short, Aristotle provides “the necessary ground of human freedom” (Galston, 2002, p. 
70).  
 This position proves controversial because Galston is looking outside theories of 
liberalism for a foundation to its defining commitment to individual freedom. Galston 
(1982, p. 629) acknowledges this strange turn by claiming: 
Liberalism contains within itself the resources it needs to declare and to defend a 
conception of the good life that is in no way truncated or contemptible.  Indeed, 
one could on this basis develop…a liberal theory of virtue: the traits of character 
that individuals must possess if they are to uphold liberal institutions and to 
pursue their good within these institutions. 
 
Why, then, does Galston use Aristotle’s arguments that are outside the liberal tradition?  
Only by folding Aristotle into his larger liberal framework can Galston accomplish the 
goals of 1) identifying the basic human goods and fundamental assumptions unifying 
liberal society and 2) allowing for a multiplicity of choice worthy or deserving ways of 
life.  Both Galston (1991, p. 167) and Nussbaum attempt to strike a balance here, 
arguing that “a liberal theory of the human good must achieve at least minimal unity and 
objectivity…[and] it must also leave very substantial room for individual choice and 
diversity.”  Here, Galston explicitly differentiates himself from Aristotle’s telos.  There 
is no perfect, complete human good; the closest approximation to Aristotle’s telos that 
Galston offers comes in the form of an outline of deliberative space determined by basic 
commitments and liberal virtues.  These are not indications of perfection, nor are they 
possessed only by the paragon of virtue.  Instead, they are inclinations or intuitions 
affirmed by a pluralistic liberal society.  Individuals may possess one or all of the 
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virtues; they may affirm one or all of the commitments, but the key to both is their 
contestability and the individual’s ability to choose and deliberate.  
 Galston’s additions of contestability and the freedom to deliberate represent his 
major deviations from Aristotle’s work; they are the distinctive features of Galston’s 
Intuitive Aristotelianism.  Building on Aristotle’s basic insight that we crave social 
unity, Galston establishes criteria for a liberal theory of the human good – that is, a 
theory of human fulfillment that admits of diversity.  Protecting this diversity requires 
contestability and freedom to deliberate.  Social unity must be able to withstand (perhaps 
even thrive on) individual deliberation about the human good.  Key to this theory is 
Galston’s identification of liberal society’s implicit recognition of human excellence.  
Galston points out this implicit recognition and then works to define what liberal 
societies do (and/or should) recognize as excellent.  To this end, Galston uses two 
Aristotelian premises to create his catalogue of liberal virtues:  the first, virtue is human 
excellence and, the second, Aristotle’s theory of the unity of the virtues.  This catalogue 
of liberal virtues provides the ground rules for individual behavior.  It establishes 
guidelines through which individuals can understand the limits of their deliberative 
efforts.  If deliberation leads to behavior in opposition to a liberal virtue, then the 
deliberation has extended beyond the constrained space established to protect social 
unity.   
If this is Intuitive Aristotelianism, then how successful is it in providing a 
defensible application of Aristotle to contemporary issues?   How successful is Galston’s 
appropriation of Aristotle?  Galston stands on firm philosophical ground when he returns 
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to and relies on Aristotle’s argument about our longing for political community and 
Aristotle’s defense of rationality and human excellence.  Galston follows Aristotle’s 
logic about rationality to its conclusion. That is, Galston places rationality at the 
forefront of his defense of liberalism.  Although Galston is unwilling to rank rationality 
higher in any form of hierarchy, his argument for the primacy of deliberation does this 
implicitly.  In this way, Galston is more Aristotelian than he recognizes.  In his effort to 
protect pluralism, however, Galston stops short of following Aristotle’s logic concerning 
telos and human excellence to its conclusion.  Instead, Galston creates a catalogue of 
virtues designed to outline the constrained space in which an individual may debate (i.e., 
contest) competing understandings of human fulfillment.   
Galston’s use of Aristotle to protect individual deliberation through 
individualistic virtues is weak. That is, Galston’s use of Aristotle to support liberal 
individualism attempts to extend Aristotle’s insights too far. 11  Galston’s use of Aristotle 
to establish the limits of individual deliberation, the constrained space needed to keep 
society cohesive, is a strong one.  This use is echoed by Alasdair MacIntyre in his 
Modified Aristotelianism.  As an example of contemporary Aristotelianism, Galston 
teaches us to avoid using Aristotle’s philosophy to support individualism, but he also 
reveals how Aristotle’s logic might support including excellences beyond his original 
                                                 
11
 Where Nussbaum’s fails to make her Aristotelian foundation concrete and Arendt fails 
to see Aristotle’s philosophical uses beyond praxis, Galston’s use of Aristotle applies 
Aristotle’s insights too broadly. Galston’s project might be strengthened by a more 
restrained application of Aristotle’s political philosophy.  
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schema.  Modified Aristotelianism seizes this revelation (albeit independently) and 
develops it further. I explore this feature of Modified Aristotelianism in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER V 
 MODIFIED ARISTOTELIANISM 
 
Here, I examine Alasdair MacIntyre’s Modified Aristotelianism as articulated in 
After Virtue, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, Three Rival Versions of Moral 
Enquiry, and Dependent Rational Animals.  MacIntyre uses Aristotle’s ethical theory, 
metaphysical biology and concept of the common good to construct an Aristotelian 
virtue ethic with two components: (1) independent/autonomous virtues (those discussed 
in Aristotle’s philosophy), and (2) virtues of acknowledged dependence.  The virtues of 
acknowledged dependence represent MacIntyre’s modification of Aristotle’s philosophy.  
MacIntyre’s appropriation of Aristotle’s philosophy offers a social remedy—a combined 
catalogue of Aristotelian and humanitarian virtues—for the ills of modernity.  
MacIntyre’s Modified Aristotelianism is based on the reaffirmation of Aristotle’s 
method of analysis, particularly his “metaphysical biology,” but also features an 
expansion of Aristotle’s definition of telos and additions to his catalogue of virtues 
(Knight, 2007, p. 2).  It is MacIntyre’s use of Aristotle’s logic to expand and improve 
upon Aristotle’s work that makes Modified Aristotelianism successful.  
MacIntyre (1999, p. 127) argues that criticism levied against Aristotle for his 
political exclusion and elitism stems from the natural dissatisfaction with Aristotle’s 
emphasis on being autonomous and denigration of humankind’s “animality, 
vulnerability, and dependence.”  For MacIntyre, Aristotelianism is capable of 
transcending this limitation. Indeed, MacIntyre claims that the resources for fixing this 
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incorrect priority exist within Aristotle’s philosophy.  To make this argument, MacIntyre 
(1999, pp. 7, 127) rejects the megalopsychos as the “paragon of the virtues.” This 
rejection becomes necessary, according to MacIntyre (1999, p. 1), when we admit to 
ourselves that “human beings are vulnerable to many kinds of affliction and…It is most 
often to others that we owe our survival, let alone our flourishing.”  We owe our survival 
to others because they care for us physically and mentally, exhibiting the virtues of 
acknowledged dependence (e.g., trustworthiness, reliability, just generosity, etc.) 
necessary for meaningful community (MacIntyre, 1999, pp. 110-126).  
MacIntyre (1999, p. 110) argues that virtues of acknowledged dependence are the 
products of commonly understood rules, the foundation of our social relationships.  
These rules are the backbone of community, the existence of which is essential for the 
cultivation of virtue.  Dependent virtues – and the recognition of our dependence that 
comes through practicing them – foster the mutual respect and cooperation necessary for 
a political organization that fulfills physical, intellectual, emotional, and spiritual needs 
(MacIntyre, 1999, p. 124).  In addition, dependent virtues compliment independent 
virtues to create the communal standards of justice required for political organization.  
MacIntyre creates the virtues of acknowledged dependence (using Aristotle’s logic and 
methodology) to complete Aristotle’s catalogue of independent virtues.  This 
combination characterizes a Modified Aristotelianism, which proves more defensible 
that either Practical, Abstract, or Intuitive Aristotelianism.  The strength of Modified 
Aristotelian is its description of political community with guidelines for the inclusion of 
groups Aristotle summarily excludes, and its ability to address the primary inadequacy 
 88 
 
 
of Aristotle’s moral-political theory, namely, his neglect of the dependent aspects of the 
human experience.   Abstract Aristotelianism fails to provide the substance for its 
Aristotelian foundation; Practical Aristotelianism denies the substantive, ethical 
foundation for its concept of political praxis; and Intuitive Aristotelianism overestimates 
the breadth and depth of its philosophical foundation.  By contrast, Modified 
Aristotelianism provides an Aristotelian foundation and describes the ethical and social 
substance that foundation implies, extending or modifying Aristotle where necessary.   
In After Virtue, MacIntyre’s critique of modernity is not, as some suggest, 
“…clothed as a rejection of the modern world;” rather, it is a rejection of modern moral 
schemas.
1
  To describe MacIntyre’s conception of modernity as simply “negative” or to 
                                                 
1
 See Pinkard (2003, pp. 176-200) for the opposite interpretation of MacIntyre’s critique 
of modernity.  Pinkard (2003, p. 181) suggests “MacIntyre’s proposal has never been for 
us even to attempt to move back to a premodern, nonindividualist society; he has instead 
suggested what alternative process would be necessary for a new, nonindividualist 
society of the future to take shape.” Indeed, MacIntyre does not offer communal 
restoration because he does not believe, in his trilogy, that such restoration is possible.  
MacIntyre’s objections to classical society, which Pinkard accurately describes, do not 
overshadow MacIntyre’s disdain for modernity and hopelessness about its future—that 
is, MacIntyre’s pessimism about the possibility of society recovering a coherent and 
rationally defensible concept of morality—that permeates After Virtue, Whose Justice? 
Which Rationality?, and Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry. For the argument that 
MacIntyre is “a modernist per excellence,” see Pinkard (2003, pp. 197-198).  
 89 
 
 
label MacIntyre as “a modernist par excellence” oversimplifies MacIntyre’s work 
(Pinkard, 2003, p. 196).   MacIntyre’s critique is intended to illustrate how and why 
moral incommensurability came to be and his use of Aristotelian philosophy in 
Dependent Rational Animals provides the modifications necessary to help us reintegrate 
virtue  into the modern conversation.     
Modernity, according to MacIntyre (1990, pp. 216-217), is fragmented 
intellectual terrain absent “fundamental assumptions on the basis of which it is able to 
articulate disagreements and organize debates.”  Thus, modernity is currently unable to 
help us decide “between the claims of rival and incompatible accounts of justice 
competing for our moral, social, and political allegiance” (MacIntyre, 1988, p. 2). 
MacIntyre (1988, p. 3) argues that criteria for such a decision should not be established 
by arguments used “as weapons,” but by arguments presenting a clear, consistent 
“expression of rationality.”   Consequently, MacIntyre (1988, p. 3) seeks to present such 
an “expression of rationality.” For MacIntyre (1988, p. 403), rational justification of a 
particular view of justice, morality, and rationality itself is not impossible, but it does 
depend on “the adequacy and the explanatory power of the histories which the resources 
of each of those traditions in conflict enable their adherents to write.”  Here, MacIntyre 
(1988, p. 117) acknowledges that vastly different, yet legitimate, arguments could be 
developed from his insights, but he exhorts us “to begin speaking as protagonists of one 
contending party or fall silent.”  With this in mind, MacIntyre becomes an advocate for 
Aristotelian philosophy and the necessity of its reaffirmation, a decision he justifies 
through his critique of modernity and moral philosophy. 
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To define the issues plaguing modernity, MacIntyre suggests that the crisis of 
modern political thought is actually a crisis of morality.  As such, the crisis is modern 
political philosophy’s inability to justify morality rationally (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 14).  
According to MacIntyre (1984, p. 53), the Protestant Reformation, the Jansenist Catholic 
movement, and new science “embodied a new concept of [the] reason” used by classical 
philosophy and scholasticism to justify morality.  The new concept held that reason was 
“powerless to correct our passions” and promote morality (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 54).  
Theological concepts of grace replaced reason as the means to “genuine comprehension 
of…[humankind’s] true end” or telos (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 53).  MacIntyre (1984, p. 54) 
proposes that the new science (beginning in the sixteenth century) limited reason’s 
explanatory power to “truths of fact and mathematical relations but nothing more.”  
Thus, political or philosophical thinkers abandoned reason as a justification for morality 
leaving society disoriented.  In this directionless society, “questions of truth in morality 
and theology…have become matter for private allegiances” rather than relevant studies 
seeking fundamental assumptions and their justification (MacIntyre, 1990, p. 217). 
Left with fragments of teleological morality, Enlightenment thinkers (e.g., Denis 
Diderot and Immanuel Kant) attempted to create a rational basis for morality 
(MacIntyre, 1984, p. 50).  MacIntyre (1984, p. 55) argues that the Enlightenment failed 
to provide justification for morality because it had inherited a fragmented and disjointed 
moral philosophy.  This fragmentation was caused by the Reformation and new 
science’s reevaluation of reason, but also by the secularization of morality and the 
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rejection of Aristotle’s teleological “view of human nature, any view of…[humankind] 
as having an essence which defines…[its] true end” (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 54). 
Telos and the teleological view of human nature were rejected when the 
Reformation and related movements questioned the ultimate conception of telos in the 
“old religion” and the “old world,” thus bringing the existence of telos itself into 
question (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 52).  MacIntyre argues that telos is among the essential 
elements of the rational justification for morality, articulated by Aristotelian thought.  
The first element is the recognition that humans are incomplete and unfulfilled without 
morality.  The second element is the belief that humankind has a telos, a vision of how 
we could be or ought to be, and this telos is a goal worth seeking. The third element 
suggests that morality is the means to attaining the telos of our existence.  According to 
MacIntyre (1984, pp. 50-55), the Reformation, new science, and the secularization of 
morality disenfranchised reason and destroyed political philosophy’s belief in the second 
element, the existence of a telos for humankind.  Thus, morality as the Enlightenment 
understood it (and as we now understand it) lacks a teleological frame. Therefore it 
cannot be justified rationally (MacIntyre, 1984, pp. 50-55).   
The crisis of modern thought, according to MacIntyre (1984, p. 19), can be 
witnessed in the failure of the Enlightenment to justify morality and the subsequent 
creation of our current emotivist culture.  Emotivism, as MacIntyre (1984, p. 12) 
describes it, “is the doctrine that all…moral judgments are nothing but expressions of 
preference, expression of attitude or feeling.”  Our emotivist culture lacks a goal or telos 
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to unite its members or create community among them. Thus, individualism is overly 
emphasized and the community and morality are devalued (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 10).   
After evaluating several thinkers’ solutions to the crisis of morality or political 
thought in After Virtue, MacIntyre (1984, p. 259) argues that the most complete and 
rational justification for morality is found in Aristotle’s teleological philosophy.  
Echoing Aristotle, MacIntyre (1984, p. 259) suggests that human beings can only 
understand themselves and their telos in community – the venue in which human beings 
develop virtue through relationships, and successfully pursue their telos, eudaimonia or 
happiness.  MacIntyre (1984, p. 259) describes human beings as “story-telling 
animal[s]” who receive moral teachings from stories told in their community.  Thus, 
MacIntyre (1984, p. 259) discredits solutions to the crisis of morality that require a 
separation from society where storytelling is relevant. 
In Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, MacIntyre (1988) examines three 
traditions of justice and rationality, affirmed by Aristotle, Augustine, and the Scottish 
Enlightenment respectively.  A tradition is “part of the elaboration of a mode of social 
and moral life in which intellectual enquiry itself was an integral part”  (MacIntyre, 
1988, p. 349). Traditions offer “contending accounts of practical rationality and justice” 
(MacIntyre, 1988, p. 349).  Traditions give us context.  They provide a narrative for our 
shared experience.  They suspend the search for an external standard by which we may 
judge rationality and provide us with competing definitions of reason.  Our task, then, is 
to compare the way in which each tradition arrived at their concept of justice and 
practical reason. Only through “the debates, conflicts, and enquiry of socially embodied, 
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historically contingent traditions” can we search for definitions of justice, political 
community, and virtue (MacIntyre, 1988, p. 349).  The strongest traditions are those in 
which “the rationality of the tradition has been confirmed in its encounters with other 
traditions” (MacIntyre, 1988, p. 403). The Aristotelian tradition has passed this test, 
making it a viable tradition to ground an articulation of the inadequacies of the liberal 
condition.  
While MacIntyre (1988, p. 403) stops short of labeling Aristotelian philosophy as 
practically perfect, he does argue that adherents to Aristotle’s tradition “have every 
reason at least so far to hold that the rationality of their tradition has been confirmed in 
its encounters with other traditions.”  Further, MacIntyre (1988, p. 402) argues that the 
Aristotle’s philosophy provides an, as of yet unparalleled, justification for morality and 
explanation of human nature “with resources for its own enlargement, correction, and 
defense.”  MacIntyre (1988, p. 402) describes Aristotelian philosophy as in need of some 
“enlargement” and “correction.” However, he contends that classical philosophy’s 
metaphysics is essential to understanding and rationally justifying morality (MacIntyre, 
1990, p. 111). He (1984, p. 259) argues that the crisis of modern political thought or 
morality can be somewhat assuaged by a restoration or rediscovery of the Aristotelian 
tradition “that restores intelligibility and rationality to our moral and social attitudes and 
commitments.”  MacIntyre (1984, p. 263) continues by offering his version of an escape 
from modernity - gathering together in insulated communities akin to Aristotle’s polis 
“within which civility and the intellectual and moral life can be sustained.”  Only by 
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seeking to imitate Aristotle’s polis can individuals hope to survive intellectually, 
spiritually, and morally in “the new dark ages” of modernity (1984, p. 259).  
In Dependent Rational Animals, MacIntyre (1999, p. 117) commits to 
Aristotelian philosophy as not only as diagnostic tool for modernity, but a prescriptive 
philosophy.  I now turn to the Modified Aristotelianism MacIntyre developed on the 
foundation of his After Virtue trilogy. In Dependent Rational Animals, MacIntyre (1999, 
p. x) describes his project as “a continuation of, but also a correction to, some of my 
earlier enquiries.”  With this, MacIntyre (1999, p. 77) presents his modified reading of 
Aristotle that accepts the philosopher’s broad, formal definition of telos as eudaimonia 
or flourishing, “the highest good attainable by action.”2  But he uses Aristotelian 
language to expand the substantive force of that formal definition and the list of social 
relationships necessary for flourishing through the cultivation of two forms of virtue.   
The foundation of MacIntyre’s treatment of Aristotelian virtue appears in After 
Virtue when he discusses practice.  Practices are coherent, complex, and cooperative 
human activities (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 187). The goods of a practice are internal; they are 
realized “in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are 
appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity” (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 
187).  A practice is more than a task; it is an enterprise (e.g., arts, sciences, games, 
politics) (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 188).  Practices require virtues.  Why? Practices demand 
“a certain kind of relationship between” participants.  Virtues “define our relationships 
to those other people with whom we share the kind of purposes and standards which 
                                                 
2
 See Nicomachean Ethics 1095a15-20. 
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inform practices” (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 191).  For us to engage in practices, then, 
MacIntyre must outline a catalogue of virtues. 
This project is Aristotelian in form in that MacIntyre (1999, p. 5) examines “our 
animal condition,” thus using nature as a normative guide; and he insists on a 
teleological—albeit modified—ethical schema.  Expanding his earlier moral philosophy, 
MacIntyre (1999, pp. 6-7) describes Aristotle’s particular inadequacy, the self-
sufficiency model, but uses “Aristotle’s concepts, theses and arguments” to complete 
Aristotle’s own philosophy. Thus, MacIntyre (1988, p. 402) puts into practice the praise 
he offered the Aristotelian tradition in Whose Justice? Which Rationality? – that 
Aristotle’s philosophy has the greatest “resources for its own enlargement, correction, 
and defense.”  With the idea of adding the missing piece to moral philosophy using 
Aristotelian philosophy, MacIntyre (1988, p. 402) offers more specific criticism of 
Aristotle’s philosophy than his own previous readings by highlighting Aristotle’s 
“failure to acknowledge the facts of affliction and dependence.”   
For example, thinkers critique Aristotle’s justification for slavery, his political 
exclusion of women and workers, and his description of the magnanimous man.
3
  
MacIntyre (1999, pp. 7, 127) argues that the undercurrent of this criticism is the natural 
dissatisfaction with Aristotle’s (and modern moral philosophy’s) emphasis on being 
“self-sufficiently superior” and insistence on systematically denigrating humankind’s 
“animality, vulnerability, and dependence.”  
                                                 
3
 See Kraut and Skultety (2005) and Annas (1996) for interesting takes on these 
critiques. 
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At the heart of MacIntyre’s (1999, pp. 7, 127) agreement with this criticism is his 
Thomistic rejection of Aristotle’s magnanimous man or megalopsychos as the “paragon 
of the virtues.”  MacIntyre (1999, p. 136), who in his earlier work minimized the 
importance of that critique, 
 
now affirms and expands it by reminding his reader that 
modern society’s egalitarianism frequently excludes the disabled, the infirm, the elderly, 
and children.
4
  If Aristotle’s self-sufficiency model is the main root of his much 
criticized elitism, then MacIntyre tackles this problem head on without diluting 
Aristotelian philosophy, but completing it with the virtues of acknowledged dependence 
(Knight, 2007, p. 134).  
Dependent Rational Animals chronicles MacIntyre’s struggle with this critique of 
Aristotle and his realization that it is applicable, in different ways, to many modern 
accounts of morality.  MacIntyre uses Aristotle’s method—a combination of 
anthropology, sociology, and biology—to illustrate the necessary expansion and 
correction his philosophy requires. Diverging from this restoration perspective, 
MacIntyre now suggests that by accepting this critique and integrating the missing piece 
we can create a comprehensive and rationally justifiable understanding of virtue that 
modernity could (and should) feasibly adopt.
 5
  With this, I argue that MacIntyre (1999, 
p. 77)  reinvigorates and improves Aristotelian thought, creating his Modified 
                                                 
4
 See MacIntyre (1988, p. 402) for details of the critique dismissal.  
5
 See MacIntyre (1988, 1990) for details about his adoption of an Aristotelian framework 
through which to examine various traditions. 
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Aristotelianism and making Aristotle’s insights relevant and plausible in the context of 
modernity.  
 MacIntyre (1999, pp. 110-126) completes Aristotelian philosophy by creating a 
second category of virtues, those of acknowledged dependence, such as trustworthiness, 
reliability, just generosity, temperateness, and misericordia.  On this point, MacIntyre’s 
work is structured similar to Galston’s outline of a catalogue of liberal virtues.  Galston’s 
and MacIntyre’s work overlap at some points (e.g., classifying reliability, responsibility, 
and, to a certain degree, independence, as a virtue).  Both thinkers also cite the source of 
their virtue catalogues as society’s commonly held understanding – what Galston calls 
intuition and what MacIntyre (1999, p. 110) calls social rules – of appropriate behavior.  
For both Galston and MacIntyre, this behavior is broadly understood as our expectations 
of others.  
Virtues of acknowledged dependence are the foundation of our social 
relationships (MacIntyre, 1999, p. 110).  MacIntyre (1999, p. 110) echoes Aristotle when 
he argues that these rules are the backbone of community, the existence of which is 
essential for the cultivation of virtue.  MacIntyre’s (1984, p. 263) earlier work echoed 
Aristotle’s arguments for the supremacy of insulated, self-sufficient, and internally 
egalitarian communities. MacIntyre (1999, p. 145) still advocates small, egalitarian 
communities, but their insulation is no longer necessary, and those suffering from 
physical and/or mental impairments are now seen as contributing members.
 6
   In 
                                                 
6
 See Aristotle’s Politics 1252b28. 
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addition, the member’s equality originates from their dependence on each other for 
physical, intellectual, emotional and spiritual flourishing.    
 MacIntyre (1999, p. 124) extends his analysis of community to include what he 
believes to be essential virtues, cooperation and misericordia.  Misericordia is a passion, 
our “urgent and extreme need without respect of persons,” and a virtue, the instinctual 
desire to use our abilities and resources to fulfill another’s need (MacIntyre, 1999, p. 
124).   First articulated by Thomas Aquinas, misericordia is “grief or sorrow over 
someone else’s distress, just insofar as one understands the other’s distress as one’s 
own” (MacIntyre, 1999, p. 125).  Misericordia, an example of the virtues of 
acknowledged dependence, is particularly indispensable to community because it is the 
virtuous human response to our condition of dependence (MacIntyre, 1999, p. 124).     
 Like Aristotle, MacIntyre (1999, p. 77) argues that the question, “What is human 
flourishing or telos?,” must be explained by asking, “What is virtue?” MacIntyre (1999, 
p. xii) provides what he sees as the missing piece in classical philosophy by adopting 
Aristotle’s framework (i.e., respect for nature’s normative role in understanding 
humankind and the necessity of social relationships), while rejecting aspects of his work 
(i.e., the supremacy of intellectual/theoretical virtue and the magnanimous man).   This 
missing piece is the acknowledgement of our “animality, disability, and vulnerability,” 
followed by recognition of the value of social relationships that exemplify and assuage 
those conditions (e.g., parent-child interactions) and praise for the virtues cultivated 
therein (MacIntyre, 1999, p. xii). 
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MacIntyre (1984, p. 149) emphasizes the importance of Aristotle’s telos, 
flourishing experienced by striving to live the contemplative life.
7
  However, MacIntyre 
attributes Aristotle’s elevation of theoria as an over-emphasis on self-sufficiency, and 
offers praise for praxis and poesis along with theoria, much in the tenor of Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics.  MacIntyre’s Thomistic critique of Aristotle’s self-sufficiency model 
allows him to pluralize, but not relativize, our concept of telos and provide the other 
“half” so to speak of Aristotle’s catalogue of virtues, the virtues of acknowledged 
dependence.  Given that Aristotle’s self-sufficiency model is the main root of his much 
criticized political exclusivism, MacIntyre appears to have solved this problem without 
diluting Aristotelian philosophy, by completing and complimenting it with the virtues of 
acknowledged dependence (Knight, 2007, p. 134). 
 MacIntyre’s (1999, pp. xi, 124) project falls in step with thinkers like Thomas 
Aquinas who developed accounts of virtue that “not only supplement, but also correct 
Aristotle’s” account by adding dependent virtues to Aristotle’s catalogue, based on 
theological justifications appropriate for the tenor of their time.  However, MacIntyre 
offers a synthesis of the virtues of acknowledged dependence and Aristotle’s 
independent virtues absent theological justification.  MacIntyre (1999, p. 124) augments 
Aristotle’s catalogue by arguing that the virtues of acknowledged dependence belong in 
our “catalogue of the virtues, independent of their theological grounding.”  MacIntyre 
(1999, p. 22) replaces theological arguments with references to the psychology, 
sociology, anthropology, particularly the social structures and interactions present in 
                                                 
7
 See Nicomachean Ethics 1178a5-10. 
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nature, most notably the behavior of dolphins.  MacIntyre (1990, p. 112) writes “with the 
intentions and commitments of a Thomistic Aristotelian,” thus the exclusion of 
theological justification is an intentional and appropriate choice, considering 
modernity’s disdain for theological arguments.8  
Building on Aristotle, MacIntyre (1999, p. 133) refers to nature as the normative 
guide illuminating the human condition to illustrate that equally commendable virtues 
exist apart from Aristotle’s catalogue of virtues.  For example, MacIntyre (1999, p. 22) 
argues that dolphins purpose their telos and “flourish only because they have learned 
how to achieve their goals through strategies concerted with other members of the 
different groups to which they belong or which they encounter.”  In addition, MacIntyre 
(1999, pp. 25-26) cites examples of dolphins’ hunting practices to suggest that nature 
endows some animals with the intuitive understanding of their telos and its goods (e.g., 
eating fish).  Nature endows these same animals with the capacities (e.g., 
communication) required to evaluate and modify their behavior (e.g., pushing fish 
toward the shore) based on its contribution to the pursuit of their telos. 
Dolphins’  “perceptual learning” from experience is also exhibited in “what they 
have shown themselves able to learn from human trainers” (MacIntyre, 1999, pp. 25-26).  
MacIntyre (1999, pp. 25-26) argues that these behaviors illustrate that dolphins’ 
perceptual learning capacity and the actual application of their acquired knowledge to 
behavior reveals that they are “no mere passive receptors of experience. And, like human 
beings, dolphins take pleasure in those activities which are the exercise of their power 
                                                 
8
 See also MacIntyre (2006b, p. xi). 
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and skills.”  MacIntyre concludes this example by citing Aristotle’s similar observation 
of human behavior “that there is pleasure in all perceptual activity and that the pleasure 
supervenes upon the completed activity.”  This is a two-fold example illustrating an 
animal incarnation of 1) the inclination to pursue telos and subsequent goods using our 
perceptual abilities, and 2) the importance of the herd (social relationships) to this 
pursuit. As it did for Aristotle, for MacIntyre, the behavior of dolphins provides 
remarkable insight into the natural inclinations and behavior of human beings.   
Defending his use of nature as a normative standard, MacIntyre (1999, pp. 25-26) 
suggests, “The similarities between their [dolphins’] strategies in pursuing their goals 
and the strategies of human beings have been obvious to human observers at least since 
Aristotle.”  MacIntyre completes classical philosophy with the virtues of acknowledged 
dependence, in part, by analyzing the social behavior exhibited in nature (e.g., dolphins’ 
behavior) and also by observing the natural behavior in dependent, necessary, and 
fruitful relationships between human beings (e.g., parent-child and husband-wife).  
MacIntyre (1999, p. 63) uses his analysis of “natural social” behavior, both animal and 
human, to reveal humankind’s “animality” and dependence.  In addition to our 
“animality,” MacIntyre (1999, p. 63) suggests nature also reveals human beings’ unique 
characteristic, our “distinctive rationality.” 
Like dolphins, humans depend on each other for socialization and survival.  
However, unlike dolphins, human dependence extends one dimension further; humans, 
particularly children, depend on elders to impart an understanding of our telos and the 
virtues it demands (D'Andrea, 2006, p. 376).  It is this self-examination or self-
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awareness, particularly in the form of independent practical reasoning, that MacIntyre 
argues sets humans apart from dolphins and other animals.  His observation of human 
and dolphin behavior, then, reveals to MacIntyre 1) the naturalness of dependence (i.e., 
our animality), 2) the nature of human dependence and the character of human 
rationality, and 3) what type(s) of behavior human beings consider virtuous in 
dependence-based relationships.  By founding his project on what he considers to be 
rightly ordered natural occurrences such as dolphins’ cooperation in hunting and an adult 
child caring for an elderly parent, MacIntyre justifies his completion Aristotle’s 
philosophy with the virtues of acknowledged dependence using the philosopher’s own 
method (i.e., nature as a normative guide and looking to what humans generally perceive 
to be moral or “good” action). 
 In addition to analyzing animal behavior, MacIntyre (1999, p. 16) also observed 
humankind in context - in our everyday environment marked by various life-stages - to 
gain a practical understanding of dependent virtues.  For example, MacIntyre (1999, p. 
116) considers “relationships of affection and sympathy,” such as the parent-child 
relationship and the caregiver-disabled/infirm relationship.  The intuitive and natural 
foundation for dependent virtues reveals MacIntyre’s continued devotion to Aristotle’s 
method of using nature as a guide for understanding human kind.
9
  MacIntyre (1999, p. 
156) argues that “in order to flourish, we need both “those virtues that enable us to 
function as independent and accountable practical reasoners [Aristotle’s virtues] and 
those virtues that enable us to acknowledge the nature and extent of our dependence on 
                                                 
9
 See Nicomachean Ethics 1117a 4. 
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others.” This combination leads to deeper fulfillment and more complete happiness, 
marked by genuine humility and cooperation, than Aristotle’s philosophy alone 
(MacIntyre, 1999, p. 156).     
 Although he had yet to describe his dependent virtues in his After Virtue trilogy, 
MacIntyre (1999, p. 126) does argue that “intellectual vulnerability” is the mark of good 
moral theorizing.  Not until Dependent Rational Animals, however, does MacIntyre 
(1999, p. 139) acknowledge the importance of physical and emotional vulnerability.  
MacIntyre (1999, p. 139) argues that “what we may learn about ourselves from 
grappling with” the disabled or infirm is awareness of our society’s disordered priorities 
and disconnected moral evaluations. This awareness is the first step toward recognizing 
our own vulnerabilities and developing social relationships not based on pity, 
condescension, or guilt.   
 With this, MacIntyre addresses one of the most powerful critiques of Aristotelian 
philosophy, abhorrence of his elitist political exclusion. MacIntyre, then, is not forced to 
reject Aristotle.  Instead, MacIntyre uses Aristotle’s framework to illuminate his 
shortcomings, reaffirm his explanations of human psychology and morality, and justify 
additions to his catalogue of virtue.  Thus, MacIntyre (1984, p. 14) offers a remedy for 
modernity’s inability to justify morality rationally, which he considers to be the crisis of 
modernity. MacIntyre’s Modified Aristotelianism praises Aristotle’s unparalleled insight 
and initiates a novel approach that evaluates modern ideas using the teleological 
orientation of his philosophy and his articulation of universal standards.  This approach 
recognizes the limitations and faults of Aristotle’s work, but remembers what he 
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successfully explained, the rational justification of virtue and the teleological nature of 
human beings (MacIntyre, 1999, pp. 77, 156). 
 MacIntyre’s work heralds a new phase in the appropriation of Aristotle’s 
philosophy.  Among the veins of appropriation discussed – Practical, Abstract, and 
Intuitive – Modified Aristotelianism proves the most successful because it broadens 
Aristotle’s work on Aristotle’s terms.  These thinkers – Arendt, Nussbaum, Galston, and 
MacIntyre – all work to render Aristotle’s insights applicable, to make his work relevant 
and workable for our world.  Each moves toward that goal, but none gets as close as 
MacIntyre.  Why?  MacIntyre adopts Aristotle’s logic and uses it to include excellences 
(e.g., dependence) beyond The Philosopher’s original schema.  The appropriators may 
use some of Aristotle’s concepts, but only MacIntyre adopts The Philosopher’s manner 
of thinking.  Only by applying Aristotle’s logic did MacIntyre recognize that dependent 
relationships and the virtues of acknowledge dependence were necessary to the pursuit 
of our telos. Aristotle, then, provides the framework and, in some sense, the first half of 
the picture.  MacIntyre’s (1999, p. xi) approach argues that the pursuit of our telos must 
emphasize humankind’s “animality, disability, and vulnerability” along with our desire 
for independence and self-sufficiency.  In his Modified Aristotelianism, MacIntyre uses 
the framework to draw the picture’s second half.    
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CHAPTER VI 
 CONCLUSION   
 
This dissertation is an attempt to address the problem of political discontent, a 
particularly damaging characteristic of the liberal condition and the crisis of modernity. 
Attempts to address the discontent problem appear in both empirical political science 
and normative political theory.  Evidence appropriate to each subfield demonstrates the 
existence and extent of political discontent. It is born out quantitatively in evaluations of 
political trust, political satisfaction, alienation, confidence, legitimacy, responsiveness, 
support, and approval ratings to name a few.
1
  Outside of academic work, we witness 
discontent in everyday political experience.  For example, consider the raging animosity 
that culminated in the 2011 debt-ceiling crisis.  We are dissatisfied not only with the 
outcome of politics, but with the process and structure of politics.  While the examples I 
offer are recent, the problem is not new. It remains systemic. My work here relies on 
recent scholarship in an effort to address the discontent problem as it exists today.
2
 
By virtue of our method and textual resources, political theorists are uniquely 
                                                 
1
 For a few interesting examples, see Holmes and Manning (2013), Tuorto and Blais 
(2014), Dionne Jr. (2012), Hetherington and Rudolph (2015), and Hetherington (1998).  
2
 Recent means different things to different subfields in political science.  For 
quantitative political scientists, recent often means a work published within the last five 
years.  This is not the case for political theory.  The oldest version of Aristotelianism I 
reference appeared in print in the mid-20
th
 century. 
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equipped to tackle the puzzle of political discontent.  Why?  Because this discontent, this 
moral malaise, is animated by a particular philosophical orientation, a particular answer 
to questions about our nature, political community, and our relationship with our 
fellows. We live with “some answer to these questions – we live some theory – all the 
time” (Sandel, 1996, p. ix). In short, we live the theory of political liberalism or the 
liberal condition.  Our understanding of political discontent, then, is incomplete unless 
we move beyond “the political arguments of our day” and tackle the inadequacies of the 
underlying philosophy, political liberalism, that gives them life (Sandel, 1996, p. 4).  
Addressing the crisis of modernity or the problem of political discontent requires 
a turn to Aristotle.  The four thinkers I examine acknowledge that the liberal condition, 
marked by isolation and social disconnect, and the liberal tradition that created it, 
provide little guidance when answering the questions about the good life.  They turn to 
Aristotle for help with these questions.  
Consider the following description of our predicament in the liberal West. 
What had been a community came to be recognized as an association of 
individuals:  this was the counterpart in political philosophy of the individualism 
that had established itself in ethical theory.  And the office of government was 
understood to be the maintenance of arrangements favorable to the interests of 
individuality, arrangements (that is) which emancipated the subject from the 
chains (as Rousseau put it) of communal allegiances….to enjoy it [individuality] 
came to be recognized as the main ingredient of happiness….the familiar warmth 
of communal pressures was dissipated….the familiar anonymity of communal 
life was replaced by a personal identity (Oakeshott, 1991, pp. 369-371). 
 
In their descriptions of ways to improve or recreate political community, Arendt, 
Nussbaum, Galston, and MacIntyre echo Oakeshott’s observations about the damage 
caused by deemphasizing, dismantling, weakening, or improperly grounding political 
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community. Rather than ushering in an era of contentment, the reconceptualization of 
political community leaves us disjointed, isolated, floundering, and, in extreme cases, 
excluded. Arendt (1998, p. 55) describes the dehumanization of community-less 
individuals,
3
 the loss to creativity caused by political interactions governed by economic 
exchange, and the disappearance of the public sphere. For Nussbaum (2006, p. 2), 
political community needs to be redefined in terms of social cooperation and care, rather 
than “mutual advantage.”  Galston (2002, p. 10) proposes conceptualizing political 
community as a “public system of liberty” featuring both pluralism and unity. Only this 
political community protects “civic goals of justice and unity” while allowing 
individuals and groups to purse “distinctive conceptions” of the best life (Galston, 2002, 
pp. 9-10).  In terms of movement away from liberalism, MacIntyre’s proposal is more 
radical.  Aristotle’s ethics and politics must be read together to create political 
community more concerned with behaviors – with habits – than intellectual positions.  
This political community features: 1) a state (or multiple states) charged with “upholding 
a range of civil liberties” and 2) local groups “ordering their own conversations about 
their common goods as practically rational dialogue” (MacIntyre, 2006a, p. 214). 
Political community poorly constituted leaves us with “impoverished civic life” 
(Sandel, 1996, p. 6). This poverty is identified by political philosophers writing within 
the liberal tradition and those working outside of it (e.g., communitarians and 
                                                 
3
 Arendt understands community-less individuals as self-obsessed individuals.  She 
(1998, p. 280) argues, “modern philosophy…made sure in introspection that man 
concerns himself only with himself.” 
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republicans). The four thinkers I work with in this dissertation identify as Aristotelians, 
but they do not all identify as liberals, republicans, or communitarians, to name a few 
camps of political philosophy in which Aristotelians reside. What, then, unites these 
thinkers? 
These four thinkers stand united on three points: 1) as mentioned above, each 
labels their work as Aristotelian, 2) they agree that a deep discontent, caused by the 
absence or disintegration of political community, exists, and 3) their theories aim at 
reconstituting our civic life.  Thus, each thinker uses Aristotle as a compass for our 
reorientation.  In doing so, each exemplifies a strain of contemporary Aristotelianism.  
How, briefly, do these strains differ?  
Arendt emphasizes Aristotle’s connection between theory and action (praxis) to 
begin the process of reorientation. She is particularly concerned with translating 
technical terms into everyday language. In doing do, Arendt (1954, p.19) disconnects 
Aristotle’s politics from his ethics. Her translation of virtue (aretê) into principle is a 
powerful example of this. Rather than providing guidance about appropriate political 
behavior, Arendt expands principle to include experiences like fear. This disconnection 
of Aristotle’s political philosophy from its ethical foundation leaves us with a vague 
notion of politics and the importance of politics to the human experience, but little 
ethical direction. Arendt’s Practical Aristotelianism leaves us with much talk about 
praxis, but little idea what that praxis should look like apart from political interaction.  
This disconnection of Aristotle’s political philosophy from its ethical foundation serves 
as the chief weakness of Arendt’s Practical Aristotelianism.  
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Nussbaum adopts Aristotle’s arguments about human sociability, human 
flourishing, and, to a lesser extent, natural teleology.  Nussbaum’s Aristotelianism 
emphasizes social justice infused with a vague concept of human flourishing, but it 
precludes meaningful discussion of that flourishing’s character or the habits necessary to 
achieve it.  The result is an Aristotelianism of malleable abstractions that provides 
support for moving beyond Rawls’s account of justice, but offers little guidance about 
what human beings are to do with their capabilities to pursue human flourishing. 
Galston uses Aristotle’s arguments about human sociability and human 
flourishing to ground individualistic virtue on a social/communal intuition. He 
establishes the limits of individual deliberation and uses Aristotle’s argument to define 
the constrained space needed to maintain a cohesive, liberal society. Galston’s use of 
Aristotle to support individualism is the weakest part of his work, but Intuitive 
Aristotelianism does reveal how Aristotle’s logic might support including excellences 
beyond his original schema.  Here, he provides more ethical direction than Nussbaum. 
Modified Aristotelianism seizes this revelation (albeit independently) and 
develops it. Using Aristotle’s reasoning, MacIntyre expands Aristotle’s teleology. 
MacIntyre (1999, p. xi) argues that the pursuit of our telos must emphasize humankind’s 
“animality, disability, and vulnerability” along with our desire for independence and 
self-sufficiency.  MacIntyre takes Aristotle’s insights about human sociability and, using 
Aristotle’s reasoning, carries them through to identify missing pieces of Aristotle’s 
work. These missing pieces, the virtues of acknowledge dependence, combine well with 
Galston’s Aristotelian account of liberal virtues, Nussbaum’s argument for a broader 
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understanding of human flourishing, and Arendt’s cautions about the dangers of 
individualism.  This combination helps us begin to use address the inadequacies of the 
liberal condition with Aristotle’s insights. 
How do my evaluations of each strain help political theorists understand the 
application of Aristotle’s work? Applying Aristotle’s insights requires, first, that we find 
them. This cannot be accomplished without sifting through the competing 
Aristotelianisms. For political theorists interested in overcoming the problem of 
modernity, spending our time discussing the nuanced interpretive issues is the wrong 
choice.  In fact, the distinction between political theory and philosophy hinges on 
changing the conversation from a discipline-specific (i.e., internal) debate about 
interpretation to much more sweeping efforts at application that not only engage other 
subfields in political science and other disciplines, but engage with the nonacademic 
world.  Let us explore one brief example of engaging across subfields in political 
science.  Quantitative work on political polarization and resulting declines in political 
trust (e.g., Hetherington and Rudolph (2015)) help political theorists by substantiating 
their claims of discontent in a specific socio-political arena.  Political theorists, in turn, 
provide the context and robust explanation for the discontent from which Hetherington 
and Rudolph (2015) identify a piece.  
While quantitative work describes one result of the liberal condition, it is limited 
when it comes to offering wide-reaching remedies. For example, while Hetherington and 
Rudolph (2015) are able to suggest that political trust will increase as the US economy 
improves, they are unable to speak to the systemic issue of political and social 
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dissatisfaction. Political theorists can offer insights here.  Engaging with the 
nonacademic world requires a combination of the political theory explanation and the 
quantitative work causality identification.  But why should we engage the nonacademic 
world?  Is it not enough to contribute to our disciplines? It is not enough.  Projects like 
this dissertation include lived theories – that is, as Michael Sandel (1996, p. ix) argues, 
“…we live some theory – all the time.”  If we are interested in living better, analyzing 
strains of Aristotelianism rather than focusing on interpretive debates allows us to 
organize Aristotle’s insights and slowly influence the socio-political climate. 
This is not to suggest, however, that interpretive issues warrant no discussion.  
To the contrary, the examination of interpretative issues need to take the form of 
descriptive, comparative analysis – the method I use in this dissertation. Specifically, I 
am arguing for a particular method of evaluating Aristotelian thinkers.  This is a three 
step method. First, identify how the author is an Aristotelian.  That is, determine which 
pieces of Aristotle’s work are emphasized.  Second, examine the role of that emphasis.  
That is, what does the author build on or do with Aristotle’s work?  Third, evaluate the 
strength of that building exercise.   
For example, is the thinker’s use of Aristotle internally consistent?  Does the 
author make clear the logical connection between their chosen pieces of Aristotle’s work 
and the resulting Aristotelianism?  How strong are those logical connections?  If the 
author uses Aristotle to support something The Philosopher is rarely read to support 
(e.g., social democracy), then how robust is the author’s argument?  These are the 
questions I put to Arendt, Nussbaum, Galston, and MacIntyre. Asking each thinker these 
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questions allows us to learn more about their theories. Why? It forces us to read them 
through the lense of their contribution to the project of applying Aristotle’s insights to 
the liberal condition. By comparing and contrasting these thinkers, we can more clearly 
identify the merits and pitfalls of their work.   
But what if each variation of Aristotelianism is too nuanced to classify 
accurately?  Why paint these meticulously crafted works with a broad brush?  Because 
some form of classifying – of comparative sorting and organizing – must be done to 
identify a core.  This core is what will help political theorists apply an Aristotelian salve 
to the wounds of the liberal condition.   
It is true that sorting ignores most detail.  But the work of a good sorter is to 
figure out which details serve as linchpins.
4
  This detail identification work – a 
comparative, descriptive analysis of the Aristotelianism of Arendt, Nussbaum, Galston, 
and MacIntyre – is what I have begun to do here.5  The previous four chapters include 
the explanation of my classification.  Arguments about whether the details I identify are, 
                                                 
4
 Christopher Ansell’s work, Pragmatist Democracy, is one recent example of a sorting 
effort applied to a different camp of political theory. Ansell (2011) uses the process of 
classifying pragmatist thinkers to argue that public agencies are the cornerstone of 
democracy.  This brief explanation does not present Ansell’s argument in full.  Instead, 
the example is one illustration of the benefits of classification efforts. 
5
 Others (e.g., Wallach (1992) and Knight (2007)) have gone about this work in different 
ways. 
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in fact, linchpin details, are interpretative arguments worth having.  With the project 
outline established, let me turn briefly to why I selected these four thinkers.  
I chose Arendt, Nussbaum, Galston, and MacIntyre for two reasons. First, their 
work is connected in a unique way.  Second, their work captures the trend of 
contemporary Aristotelianism.
6
  
How are they connected and what is this trend? These four thinkers speak to the 
inadequacies of the liberal condition in a specific way. Each (even MacIntyre) has made 
peace with the present and each tries to work within it.  All four thinkers agree that the 
heart of the problem – that is, the diagnosis of the liberal condition – is the absence of 
collective goods.  The substance and reintegration of these collective goods are points of 
disagreement, but the damage done by their absence is not. Arendt, Nussbaum, Galston, 
and MacIntyre recognize that without collective goods, we are alienated and unhappy. 
They all agree that our alienation is a major political problem. They each, then, use 
Aristotle’s spirit and substance to recover meaning in the liberal West.  Why? With 
relative degree of pluralism, Aristotle tells us how Greece (with its diversity) held 
together, the polis. Each agrees Aristotle helps us diagnose and give an account of 
collective meaning and why we want that for ourselves. 
What do I mean when I write that these thinkers have made peace with the 
present and try to work within it?  For Nussbaum, Galston, and MacIntyre this means 
                                                 
6
 Aristotelianism is not the only sect of political theory offering criticisms of the liberal 
condition. For example, republicanism (e.g., Sandel (1996) and Pettit (1997)) has much 
to say on the subject. 
 114 
 
 
writing in academic disciplines dominated by the Rawlsian framework, also called 
Rawlsian liberalism.  For Arendt, this means addressing the real political failures of 
liberalism.  We will spend more time on Arendt shortly.   
Let us turn to the different ways Nussbaum, Galston, and MacIntyre address 
Rawlsian dominance.  Nussbaum notes the inability of Rawlsian liberalism to develop or 
support an account of the community’s obligations to the individual.  She, then, develops 
her Aristotelianism with this goal in mind – to determine what communities owe 
individuals and how communities can deliver on those debts.  Galston notes the inability 
of Rawlsian liberalism to develop or support an account of the individual’s need for a 
purposive structure to guide their choices (i.e., virtues).  He, then, develops an 
Aristotelianism outlining the minimum standards of a purposive liberal community and 
the virtues of liberal individuals within it. MacIntyre notes the inability of Rawslian 
liberalism to provide context in which individuals and communities understand their 
symbiotic relationship.  Unlike Nussbaum and Galston, however, MacIntyre argues this 
lack of context starts long before Rawls.  Here, Arendt’s work pre-dating Rawls is also 
helpful; the inadequacies of the liberal condition began long before Rawlsian came to 
dominate political theory.   
MacIntyre’s issues, then, with Rawlsian liberalism are actually issues with the 
liberal condition.  MacIntyre writes his Aristotelianism with full knowledge that whether 
or not the conversation is dominated by Rawlsian theory, the problems with the liberal 
condition remain the same.  Why, then, these three thinkers?  The diagnosis is the same, 
but the approach is different. Nussbaum approaches the problem from the standpoint of 
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the community.  Galston approaches the problem from the standpoint of the individual.  
MacIntyre approaches the problem from the standpoint of both.  This, and his use of 
Aristotle’s method, bolster Modified Aristotelianism.   
What about Arendt?  Examining her Aristotelianism is particularly valuable 
because she writes in a world grappling with the real failures of individualism and 
political liberalism predating the Rawlsian paradigm. Using Arendt gives my 
classification effort purchase on political liberalism generally, rather than the political 
liberalism of the late 20
th
 century. While the other thinkers emphasize discontent and 
dissatisfaction, a luxury afforded by the late 20
th
 century, Arendt explores (and reminds 
us of) the danger of the liberal condition, the danger of extreme individualism to the 
community and the individual.  Although she has much to say about the dangers of 
liberalism, she does not advocate resignation.  Instead, Arendt’s work acts as the 
scaffolding.  Her method of diagnosis and solution-seeking paves the way for 
Nussbaum, Galston, and MacIntyre to identify the failures of Rawlsian theory (an 
outgrowth of the individualism and liberalism Arendt addresses) and move toward 
finding remedies for these failures.   
Given the connections shared by the four thinkers, let us now turn to the order in 
which they appear in this dissertation.  Placing these four thinkers in this particular order 
makes their connection clear. I begin with a prophetic, solution-focused thinker writing 
before Rawlsian dominance.  In short, Arendt operates outside of the Rawlsian 
paradigm.  Arendt reminds us that the problems of the liberal condition did not begin 
with Rawlsian dominance, nor would they end if Rawlsianism faded from view. From 
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there, I move to three thinkers who build on Arendt’s work, whether they are explicit 
about this or not, in that they find the liberal condition lacking (in different ways) and 
are forced to look beyond the liberal tradition to address its insufficiencies.  
With the questions of selection and ordering addressed, the next question 
emerges. Why do these thinkers choose Aristotle to address the inadequacies of the 
liberal condition? Certainly others have written about political community.  What special 
purchase does Aristotle give us?  Why Aristotle and not Plato, for example?  
First, a precedent, most notably Thomism, exists in political theory for using 
Aristotle’s work to talk to secular and religious alike. His work also allows us to speak 
across comprehensive doctrines, to borrow Rawlsian language. Given that we live in a 
world where Christianity is no longer the dominant paradigm, political theorists need the 
ability to talk to Christian and non-Christian alike.  Aristotle can help us span the gap 
between revelation-based arguments and reason-based arguments. Insights offered by 
those defending political community from a Christian perspective need not be lost to an 
increasingly secularized world.
7
   
Addressing political discontent in modern liberal societies requires a political 
philosophy divorced from revelation.  Aristotle provides an argument both compatible 
with, but independent from, Christian political thought.  In short, Aristotle’s description 
and defense of vibrant political community speaks to Christian and non-Christian 
                                                 
7
 Catholic social thought is one example of tradition too easily dismissed or ignored 
because of its connection to revelation. See Williams (2011) for a recent overview of the 
tradition. 
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alike. It does not require the reader to accept or reject a theological perspective. What 
Aristotle gives us is the ability to deliberate, to come to the table or practice of 
deliberation with our varying belief systems.  
Aristotle also gives us a model of political unity with a relative degree of 
pluralism. Arendt, Nussbaum, Galston, and MacIntyre each pick up on this balance – the 
balance between allowing individuals to deliberate about the human good and 
establishing common ground for political community.  Aristotle gives us an account of 
common ground that goes beyond physical protection and emphasizing flourishing and 
fulfillment.  Aristotelianism, then, allows us to move beyond survival and discuss what it 
might mean for humans to thrive. Why Aristotle? Why not Plato, for example? In both 
Plato’s Republic and Laws, we have an entirely metaphysical and static conception of 
the well-ordered polis. Metaphysics of one sort or another is the standard. By contrast, in 
the Politics, Aristotle is interested in how constitutions work and their variability. He 
includes a standard to judge them, but it is moral, not metaphysical. 
If Aristotle’s insights can help us justify and develop political community, then 
whose use of Aristotle gives us the leverage we need to go about this task? In short, 
whose Aristotelianism works? The short answer to this question is MacIntyre’s Modified 
Aristotelianism. But getting to the short answer – that is, identifying whose use of 
Aristotle holds water, philosophically speaking – requires an exercise in comparison.  
This comparison is better characterized as a building exercise.  This is ordering of the 
four thinkers – Arendt, Nussbaum, Galston, and MacIntyre – is important.  Chronology 
plays a role in terms of their relationship to theories of liberalism, but they are placed 
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cumulatively. That is, each builds, whether implicitly or explicitly, on the other. The 
short answer is tempting in that, on its face, it might enable us to label who got Aristotle 
right and who got him wrong. Focusing on right readings of Aristotle changes the entire 
project.  Those interpretative issues distract us from the real work.  If we are to be 
solution focused, it profits us little to advocate returning to the right version of Aristotle 
as our only alternative, our only answer to the problems of modernity.  Rather than 
returning to his work and adopting it wholesale, Aristotelianism asks us to use 
Aristotle’s work. The two advantages I describe above make Aristotle’s work a uniquely 
effective tool to diagnose and remedy the liberal condition.  This is the real labor, 
figuring out whose application of Aristotle to the problem of our discontent is one that 
works. This starts with comparative analysis and classification.    
Is it possible (or desirable) to move beyond or to synthesize the four models I use 
to strengthen the projects of contemporary Aristotelianism?  The project of 
contemporary Aristotelianism is attempting to deal with the liberal condition, to infuse 
meaning into modern life.  The four thinkers I examined share a cumulative relationship.  
Synthesis of them, then, does not mean we take an equal part from each, but that we take 
the strongest pieces from each.  I have worked to identify these pieces and illustrate their 
appearance in the next thinker’s work in the previous four chapters.   
MacIntyre’s Modified Aristotelianism provides the strongest starting point for an 
Aristotelianism aimed at offering a different vantage point from which to view the 
liberal condition.  Modified Aristotelian, in many ways the culmination of the thinkers I 
have compared, is a springboard to applying Aristotle’s connections between theory and 
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practice, between inquiry and assumption, between public and private to a theoretical 
approach to liberal democracy.  The way MacIntyre arrives at his insights is as important 
as the insights themselves.  MacIntyre uses Aristotle’s framework to identify the missing 
pieces of Aristotle’s work.  Modified Aristotelianism, then, features a method, a type of 
inquiry that encourages deliberation with yourself and with your fellows, discourages 
dichotomous thinking, and integrates the community and the individual.  
Yes, it is possible to use my analysis to pursue the project of contemporary 
Aristotelianism, because this project is concerned with infusing meaning into our 
modern lives. Take the model MacIntyre’s Modified Aristotelianism provides, with its 
vantage point different from liberalism and different from traditionalism, to engage in 
rational inquiry, to go about the business of making life meaningful.  I have identified 
MacIntyre’s ability to work within Aristotle’s framework to address The Philosopher’s 
limitations and tease out the work’s implications.  This is the fruit comparative analysis 
bears.  Either applying MacIntyre’s model or engaging in more comparative analysis 
looking for similarly valuable fruit are two viable options for contemporary 
Aristotelianism.      
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